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Articles
You Cannot Lose If You Choose




Several years ago, Professor Rick Duncan, in a collection of
essays by Christian legal scholars, wrote that "Christians wander
today in an America that has rejected our God-indeed, in an
America that often seems to be waging war against [Him]."'
Professor Duncan suggests that the government "let our children
go - without penalty. '2
While this may not be the dominant, or even a frequently
encountered view among our cultural elites, the observation that
public life is hostile or indifferent to religion, albeit generally
expressed in milder form, is hardly unique to Professor Duncan.3
* Rick Esenberg is an attorney in Milwaukee and an adjunct professor at
Marquette Law School. I would like to thank my wife, Karen, and my
assistant Sue Kirsling.
1. Richard F. Duncan, On Liberty and Life in Babylon: A Pilgrim's
Pragmatic Proposal, in CHRISTIAN PERSPECTIVES ON LEGAL THOUGHT 354, 355
(Michael W. McConnell, Robert F. Cochran, Jr. & Angela C. Carmella eds.,
2001).
2. Id. at 362.
3. See, e.g., STEPHEN L. CARTER, THE CULTURE OF DISBELIEF: How
AMERICAN LAW AND POLITICS TRIVIALIZE RELIGIOUS DEVOTION (1993); REV.
RICHARD JOHN NEUHAUS, THE NAKED PUBLIC SQUARE (1984). In a now famous
(or, depending on your point of view, infamous) symposium, a collection of
eminent scholars argued, among other things, that "morality - especially
traditional morality, and most especially morality associated with religion -
has been declared legally suspect." Symposium, The End of Democracy? The
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In the same collection, Michael McConnell wrote about the
tendency of modern liberals to see religion as something that
ought to be "relegate[d] . . . to the sidelines of public life."4 He
urged Christians not to give up on liberal democracy. 5 Others
have made the same point regarding the supposed hostility of the
law to religious perspectives in the public square.6
Some feel differently. Some commentators say that the claim
that faith has been driven from the public square is overstated. 7
We have erred, they argue, in permitting too much religion in the
public square and risk, not the sterility of secularism, but the
oppression of theocracy. For example, one scholar has suggested
that "[t]he American political scene has therefore now
degenerated to the point that a Christian who takes seriously"
Jesus' admonition in Mark's Gospel that one ought to pray in
private "would have a difficult time getting elected to political
office." 8 One prominent commentator observed that "[t]he wall
that separates church and state is under assault."9
Judicial Usurpation of Politics, FIRST THINGS, Nov. 1996, at 18, 19. See also
George W. Dent, Jr., Religious Children, Secular Schools, 61 S. CAL. L. REV.
863, 868-69 (1988) (summarizing a study showing secular bias in public
school textbooks).
4. Michael W. McConnell, Old Liberalism, New Liberalism, and People
of Faith, in CHRISTIAN PERSPECTIVES ON LEGAL THOUGHT, supra note 1, at 5, 6.
5. Id. at 6-7.
6. See, e.g., Lisa Shaw Roy, The Establishment Clause and the Concept
of Inclusion, 83 OR. L. REV. 1, 7 (2004) ("[T]he Court has produced a doctrine
that is poised to displace all public religious manifestations."). Bookstore
shelves are replete with more popular (and, perhaps, less nuanced)
explications of the same theme. See, e.g., ANN COULTER, GODLESS: THE
CHURCH OF LIBERALISM (2006); JOHN GIBSON, THE WAR ON CHRISTMAS (2005);
DAVID LIMBAUGH, PERSECUTION: How LIBERALS ARE WAGING WAR AGAINST
CHRISTIANITY (2003). A recent poll conducted by the Anti-Defamation League
found that 64% of the American public believes that "religion is under
attack." AMERICAN ATTITUDES TOWARD RELIGION IN THE PUBLIC SQUARE
(2005), http://www.adl.org/religious-freedom/poll-files/frame.htm.
7. Certainly we see a certain kind of religion in public places.
Politicians frequently invoke a nonspecific deity making no clear demands.
Some scholars have argued that this is precisely as it should be. See Robert
N. Bellah, Civil Religion in America, 96 DAEDALUS 1, 2 (1967).
8. Steven G. Gey, The No Religion Zone: Constitutional Limitations on
Religious Association in the Public Sphere, 85 MINN. L. REV. 1885, 1914
(2001).
9. Erwin Chemerinsky, Why the Rehnquist Court Is Wrong About the
Establishment Clause, 33 Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 221, 221 (2001). There are popular
tomes on this side as well. See, e.g., KEVIN PHILLIPS, AMERICAN THEOCRACY:
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Whether one sees America in the early twenty-first century as
"Godless" or "God-haunted" may well depend on what one believes
the role of religious discourse ought to be. Philosopher Jeffrey
Stout has defined "secularization" as "the fact that participants in
a given discursive practice are not in a position to take for granted
that their interlocutors are making the same religious
assumptions they are."10  We undoubtedly live in a secularized
society,11 in which religious perspectives are pluriform 12 and in
which religion itself may be less widely adhered to. 13
"Secularism" (at least as I will use the term here) is the view
that the absence of religious assumptions is normative. 14 As
framed by theologian Harvey Cox, it is "the name for an ideology,
a new closed world view which functions very much like a new
religion. . . . It is a closed ism. It menaces the openness and
freedom secularization has produced."' 5  Having thrown off
establishment of a particular sectarian outlook, Cox warned, we
ought not embrace a new form of establishment.16
THE PERIL AND POLITICS OF RADICAL RELIGION, OIL, AND BORROWED MONEY IN
THE 21ST CENTURY (2006).
10. JEFFREY STOUT, DEMOCRACY AND TRADITION 97 (2004).
11. On the other hand, it is far from clear that American society is as
deeply divided over all things religious as is typically assumed. The
overwhelming majority is religious and either Jewish or Christian. While we
disagree wildly about many things, it is far from clear that there are not
"core" religious principles about which an overwhelming majority would
agree. For examples of this claim from very different perspectives, compare
ALAN WOLFE, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN RELIGION: How WE
ACTUALLY LIVE OUR FAITH (2003), with PETER KREEFT, ECUMENICAL JIHAD:
ECUMENISM AND THE CULTURE WAR (1996).
12. See, e.g., DIANA L. ECK, A NEW RELIGIOUS AMERICA: HOW A "CHRISTIAN
COUNTRY" HAS Now BECOME THE WORLD'S MOST RELIGIOUSLY DIVERSE NATION
(2001).
13. See, e.g., PIPPA NORRIS & RONALD INGLEHART, SACRED AND SECULAR:
RELIGION AND POLITICS WORLDWIDE (2004) (arguing that material security is
correlated with low religiosity.). But see THE DESECULARIZATION OF THE
WORLD: RESURGENT RELIGION AND WORLD POLITICS (Peter L. Berger ed., 1999)
(arguing that religion is resurgent).
14. See STOUT, supra note 10, at 93.
15. HARVEY Cox, THE SECULAR CITY: SECULARIZATION AND URBANIZATION
IN THEOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE 18 (1965).
16. Professor Cox predicted the inevitable triumph of secularism and a
decline in the influence of traditional religion. At least outside of Western
Europe, the notion of a coming world without God now seems dated. See, e.g.,
ALISTER MCGRATH, THE TWILIGHT OF ATHEISM: THE RISE AND FALL OF
DISBELIEF IN THE MODERN WORLD (2004). The idea has been abandoned even
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Not everyone agrees. For some, secularism should be not only
a contending orthodoxy, but the norm of public discourse and of
life in the public square. We should, as far as the government is
concerned, establish a certain kind of irreligion. While the state
ought not forbid - or expressly criticize - religious practices, the
public realm (understood here as what the government funds or
that with which it is closely associated) ought to be rigorously
secular. ' 7
This view often turns on the notion that democracy in a
pluralistic society is best served by "rational," "temporary," and
relativistic modes of thought that are claimed to be present in
secular, as opposed to religious, world views. 18 Others emphasize
the need for "public reason" based upon secular premises that are
asserted to be an "overlapping consensus" shared by diverse
groups within the community. 19
But, however much an established secularism be the
preferred path for some, it has never been formally sanctioned by
the Supreme Court. Although certain Justices have, at least,
flirted with weaker 20 and stronger,21 notions of a constitutionally
by Professor Cox. HARVEY Cox, RELIGION IN THE SECULAR CITY: TOWARD A
POSTMODERN THEOLOGY (1984). Nevertheless, the distinction between
secularization and secularism is still useful and still in common use. See
generally MARTIN H. BELSKY & JOSEPH BESSLER-NORTHCUTT, LAW AND
THEOLOGY (2005).
17. See, e.g., Stephen Macedo, Constituting Civil Society: School
Vouchers, Religious Nonprofit Organizations and Liberal Public Values, 75
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 417, 418 (2000); Kathleen M. Sullivan, Religion and Liberal
Democracy, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 195, 199-201 (1992).
18. See, e.g., Steven Gey, When is Religious Speech Not "Free Speech,"
2000 U. ILL. L. REV. 379, 451 (2000).
19. See JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM (1993). See also RICHARD
RORTY, PHILOSOPHY AND SOCIAL HOPE 168-74 (1999); Daniel 0. Conkle, The
Path of American Religious Liberty: From the Original Theology to Formal
Neutrality and An Uncertain Future, 75 IND. L.J. 1, 8 (2000) (proposing that
"legal indifference" to religious differences has contributed to the view that
religion "should play little role in the political or public life of contemporary
America").
20. County of Allegheny v. ACLU, Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, 492 U.S.
573, 610 (1989) (Blackmun, J., plurality opinion) ("[T]he Constitution
mandates that the government remain secular, rather than affiliate itself
with religious beliefs or institutions.").
21. Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Bd. of Educ. of Sch. Dist. No. 71,
Champagne County, Ill., 333 U.S. 203, 216-17 (1948) (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring) ("Designed to serve as perhaps the most powerful agency for
promoting cohesion among a heterogeneous democratic people, the public
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mandated secular ethos, the Supreme Court has made clear that
neither sectarian nor secularist establishments are permitted. It
has quite consistently held that the state may not "prefe[r] those
who believe in no religion over those who do believe. '22
But this commitment to a judicially enforced neutrality is
impossible. In modern life, government involves itself in a variety
of activities that implicate its citizens' religious beliefs. If it, for
example, not only educates their children but undertakes the
formation of their character, it becomes difficult, if not impossible,
to avoid religious questions. While courts have been, for the most
part, quite sensitive to the imposition (or state sponsored display)
of the majority's religious beliefs upon - or to - nonadherents,
they have rarely had an answer for those believers who claim to be
harmed by the imposition or endorsement of irreligion.
So, on the ground, this neutrality can look suspiciously like a
judicial mandate of public secularism. In the past year alone, the
Supreme Court has held that a public display acknowledging the
Ten Commandments as a foundational document in the
development of the law constituted a violation of the
Establishment Clause. 23 A district judge, following an earlier
decision of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, held that students
who are "forced" to hear other students recite the words "under
God" in the Pledge of Allegiance have been subjected to
establishment. 24 After a well publicized trial, a district judge in
Pennsylvania held that requiring teachers to inform students that
evolutionary theory is not believed by some people and identifying
an alternative or, perhaps more accurately, supplementary theory
called "intelligent design" breached the wall of separation.25
school must keep scrupulously free from entanglement in the strife of sects.").
22. Sch. Dist. of Abington Twp., Pa. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 225 (1963)
(quoting Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 314 (1952)); see also McCreary
County, Ky. v. ACLU of Ky., 125 S.Ct. 2722, 2733 (2005).
23. McCreary, 125 S. Ct. at 2745. But see Van Orden v. Perry, 125 S. Ct.
2854, 2864 (2005) (upholding similar display).
24. Newdow v. Cong. of the United States, 383 F. Supp. 2d 1229, 1235,
1236, 1244 (E.D. Cal. 2005).
25. Kitzmiller v. Dover Sch. Dist., 400 F. Supp. 2d 707, 766 (M.D. Pa.
2005). Although the District Court also found that "intelligent design" is not
science or, to the extent that it makes scientific claims, is false, the holding
rested upon the notion that suggesting an alternative that has, for many,
profound religious implications, constitutes establishment. Id. at 735, 766.
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In a nation that turns as often as we do to judicially endorsed
norms, it is hard to dismiss the cultural, as well as juridical
implications, of our courts' decisions about church and state.
Perhaps what Professor Duncan and others are reacting against is
the idea, either legally or culturally enforced, that the price of
their participation in public life is often the demand that they put
aside their most deeply held convictions. Their sense of injury
may remind us that the notion that religion is private and, as
Canon Theologian Bishop N. T. Wright put it, should be dismissed
to the "upstairs room" and kept "out of sight,'' 26 is itself not
religiously neutral.
The sense of injury experienced by religious persons is
exacerbated by the rather ambitious objectives that this neutrality
is claimed to serve. No one, it says, should be made to feel like an
outsider.27 No one should have to sit quietly in the face of
communications that breach this neutrality. 28 It is the Court
itself that has raised this feeling of exclusion to the level of an
establishment and has suggested that government endorsement of
religious (or irreligious) ideas other than one's own constitutes
constitutional injury.
In a nation in which the divide on religious questions is as
often between the religious and irreligious as among religions, 29 a
jurisprudence that defines government neutrality on religion as
acting as if it did not exist will cause its religious citizens to feel
excluded. To people for whom duty to God is paramount and
pervasive, the ceremonial deism of politicians may be God-Talk,
26. Dr. N. T. Wright, Lecture at Jubilee Reflections at Westminster Abbey:
God and Caesar, Then and Now, http://www.westminster-
abbey.org/event/lecture/archives/020428_tom.wright.htm.
27. See Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 688 (1984) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring); see also McCreary, 125 S. Ct. at 2733 (quoting Santa Fe Indep.
Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 309-10 (2000)); Santa Fe, 530 U.S. at 309-10
(quoting Lynch, 465 U.S. at 688 (O'Connor, J., concurring)).
28. See, e.g., Santa Fe, 530 U.S. at 294, 317 (holding that a school policy
authorizing student-led and student-initiated prayers at high school football
games was an unconstitutional endorsement of religion); Lee v. Weisman,
505 U.S. 577, 580, 599 (1992) (disallowing a public school system's provision
of clergy-led, nonsectarian prayer at school graduation ceremonies); Wallace
v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 41-42, 61 (1985) (holding unconstitutional an
Alabama statute authorizing a daily period of silence in public schools for
meditation or voluntary prayer).
29. Steven G. Gey, Unity of the Graveyard and the Attack on
Constitutional Secularism, 2004 BYU L. REV. 1005, 1017 (2004).
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but it is not serious God-Talk. The secularism of those significant
parts of public life associated with the government effectively tells
them to take their religion upstairs.
It is the thesis of this Article that, if the Court means what it
says about non-establishment of secularism, its current notion of
neutrality, an idea frequently expressed in retired Justice
O'Connor's notion of nonendorsement, must be abandoned or at
least significantly modified. Complete neutrality, at least with
respect to that which government "endorses," is not possible and
aiming for an unattainable goal clothes the public square in
secularist garb. The Court's Establishment Clause goals should
be more modest. You cannot lose if you do not play.
First this Article considers the different approaches to
Establishment Clause jurisprudence, arguing that the multiple
formulations seen in the literature and cases are really efforts at
finding a stance on a continuum running between
accommodationist and separationist orientations. Next this
Article attempts to describe the stance upon which the Court has
settled, characterizing it as a somewhat aggressive form of
substantive - or "endorsement" - neutrality. This Article goes on
to argue that this approach fails on its own terms. It is not
religiously neutral and does not achieve its stated objective, i.e., to
keep the government from preferring any particular religious
perspective or religion over irreligion. It does not prevent
dissenters from being made to feel like "outsiders." Finally, this
Article proposes a new approach, rooted in avoiding historic
establishments, coercion and substantial threats to religious
pluralism. It too is a form of substantive neutrality, but a
decidedly less ambitious one.
II. THE AMBIGUOUS ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE
It has been a staple of the literature to note the confused state
of Establishment Clause jurisprudence. 30  As Justice Breyer
30. See, e.g., Robert P. George, Protecting Religious Liberty in the Next
Millennium: Should We Amend the Religion Clauses of the Constitution?, 32
Loy. L.A. L. REV. 27, 39 (1998); Michael W. McConnell, Religious Freedom at
a Crossroads, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 115, 120 (1992) ("It's a mess."). Recently, a
district judge suggested that Establishment Clause jurisprudence has
reached that stage from which salvation is no longer possible. See Green v.
Bd. of County Comm'rs, 450 F. Supp. 2d 1273 (D. Okla. 2006) ("Yes, we are
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recently observed in a classic understatement, "[tjhe First
Amendment contains no textual definition of 'Establishment,' and
the term is certainly not self-defining. '31
A consensus approach to this definitional problem has never
taken hold, resulting in jurisprudence that has been described as
"incoheren[t]" and "impenetrable and incapable of consistent
application" 32 but which, on the bright side, is a playground for
law professors. One is tempted to suggest that there are as many
theories regarding proper interpretation of the religion clauses as
there are scholars working in the field. 33
The Court has often applied the test announced in Lemon v.
Kurtzman, requiring that a statute must: (1) "have a secular
legislative purpose," (2) have "a principal or primary effect . . .
that neither advances nor inhibits religion," and (3) "not foster 'an
excessive government entanglement with religion.' ' 34 But it has
also said that the Lemon criteria are "no more than helpful
signposts," and do not represent a comprehensive test.35 The
Court has, at times, refused to apply Lemon, preferring instead to
ask whether a government action impermissibly "compelled"
conformity with an "explicit religious exercise,"36 whether it has
impermissibly "endorse[d]" religion, 37 whether it provided a
definitely in Limbo.").
31. McCreary, 125 S. Ct. at 2742.
32. Van Orden v. Perry, 125 S. Ct. 2854, 2866 (2005) (Thomas, J.
concurring). See also Twombly v. City of Fargo, 388 F. Supp. 2d 983, 986 (D.
N.D. 2005) ("The body of law as developed is convoluted, obscure, and
incapable of succinct and compelling direct analysis.").
33. See, e.g., Frank S. Ravitch, A Funny Thing Happened on the Way to
Neutrality: Broad Principles Formalism, and the Establishment Clause, 38
GA. L. REV. 489, 496-97 (2004) (identifying approaches emphasizing
"separationism," "accommodation," "equality," "liberty," nonpreferentialism,"
and various forms of "neutrality"). Neutrality, itself, apparently comes in
many forms. See, e.g., Paul E. Salamanca, Quo Vadis: The Continuing
Metamorphosis of the Establishment Clause Toward Realistic Substantive
Neutrality, 41 BRANDEIS L.J. 575, 575 (2003) ("formal" and "substantive");
Keith Werhan, Navigating the New Neutrality: School Vouchers, the Pledge
and the Limits of a Purposive Establishment Clause, 41 BRANDEIS L.J. 603
(2003) ("purposive").
34. 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971) (quoting Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S.
664, 674 (1970)).
35. Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734, 741 (1973).
36. Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 596, 598 (1992).
37. See Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 308 (2000)
(referring, however, to the purpose prong of the Lemon test).
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neutral benefit available to all without regard to religion, 38 or
whether whatever religious practice or message under challenge
was sufficiently grounded in our historical practice. 39 The Court
has made clear that it does not regard itself as confined to any one
test of establishment.40  Lemon itself has proven sufficiently
flexible to support a wide range of results.41
Justices have at times delivered ringing affirmations of the
need to maintain a "wall of separation" between church and
state,42 while, at other times, they have minimized the usefulness
of the metaphor 43 or argued that it is a barrier that cannot always
be maintained. 44
June 27, 2005 may have been a paradigmatic day for
Establishment Clause jurisprudence. As noted earlier, the Court
in McCreary County v. American Civil Liberties Union held that
the display of the Ten Commandments in a Kentucky courthouse,
along with other secular documents thought to be among the
"foundations" of American law, was unconstitutional. 45 Influenced
by the county's earlier attempts to display the Commandments
alone, a bare majority of five justices concluded that the county
lacked a primary secular purpose, failed the Lemon test, and,
consequently, would be perceived by a rational observer to have
endorsed religion.46 Justices Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas and Chief
38. See Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 638, 652 (2002).
39. See Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 792 (1983).
40. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 679 (1984).
41. Compare Everson v. Bd. of Educ. of the Twp. of Ewing, 330 U.S. 1, 16-
17 (1947) (state may provide transportation to and from religious schools),
with Wolmar v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229, 254-55 (1977) (state may not fund field
trips taken at religious schools); compare Bd. of Educ. of Cent. Sch. Dist. No.
1 v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 248 (1968) (state may pay for text books in parochial
schools), with Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349, 362 (1975) (state may not pay
for maps and other "instructional materials"). As applied, however, Lemon
often leads to separationist outcomes.
42. Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 425 (1962).
43. See, e.g., Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 107 (1985) (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting) ("The 'wall of separation between church and State' is a metaphor
based on bad history, a metaphor which has proved useless as a guide in
judging."); Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Bd. of Educ. of Sch. Dist. No. 71,
Champaign County, Ill., 333 U.S. 203, 247 (1948) (Reed, J., dissenting) ("A
rule of law should not be drawn from a figure of speech.").
44. See Van Orden v. Perry, 125 S. Ct. 2854 (2005).
45. McCreary County, Ky. v. ACLU of Ky., 125 S. Ct. 2722, 2730, 2731,
2745 (2005).
46. Id. at 2732-39.
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Justice Rehnquist dissented. 47 Justice Scalia, in that portion of
his dissent joined by the Chief Justice and Justice Thomas,
rejected both the Lemon test and, at least in part, the notion of
"nonendorsement" arguing that government is free to endorse,
without coercion, monotheistic religion.48
On the same day, in Van Orden v. Perry, the McCreary
dissenters, picking up a concurrence from Justice Breyer, upheld a
Ten Commandments display outside the Texas capitol.49 While
eight Justices, although disagreeing as to the constitutionality of
such displays, found no material difference between the
Commandments in Texas and those in Kentucky, Justice Breyer
did. This made all the difference. For Justice Breyer, the Texas
display, being much older than that in Kentucky and having
evaded challenge for most of those years, must not have been
perceived by reasonable observers as an endorsement of religion. 50
It seems likely that Justice Breyer's opinion was a prudential
move against the political furor that would be caused by taking
down decades-old displays. 5' Needless to say, the law governing
displays of civil religion remains in need of clarification. 52
The late Chief Justice Rehnquist recently suggested that the
Establishment Clause jurisprudence is "Januslike," looking both
"toward the strong role played by religion and religious traditions
throughout our Nation's history," and also "toward the principle
47. Id. at 2753, 2757.
48. Id.
49. 125 S. Ct. at 2858.
50. Id. at 2870. (Breyer, J., concurring). In Van Orden, the plurality
opinion advanced an accommodationist rationale irreconcilable with the
majority in McCreary. Id. at 2867. Although McCreary relied on Lemon, the
Van Orden plurality differed, asserting that "[w]hatever may be the fate of
the Lemon test in the larger scheme of Establishment Clause jurisprudence,
we think it is not useful in dealing with the sort of passive monument that
Texas has erected in its Capitol grounds." Id.
51. See Jay A. Sekulow & Francis J. Marion, The Supreme Court and the
Ten Commandments: Compounding the Establishment Clause Confusion, 14
WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 33, 44-45 (2005).
52. On the other hand, every decision since the date of Van Orden has
upheld public displays of the Ten Commandments. See ACLU of Ky. v.
Mercer County, Ky., 432 F.3d 624, 640 (6th Cir. 2005); ACLU of Ohio Found.,
Inc. v. Bd. of Comm'rs of Lucas County, Ohio, 444 F. Supp. 2d 805, 815-16
(N.D. Ohio 2006); Twombly v. City of Fargo, 388 F. Supp. 2d 983, 993 (D.
N.D. 2005); Card v. City of Everett, 386 F. Supp. 2d 1171, 1178 (W.D. Wash.
2005). The display of a Bible in a neon-lit case, however, remains
problematic. See Staley v. Harris County, 461 F.3d 504 (5th Cir. 2006).
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that governmental intervention in religious matters can itself
endanger religious freedom. '53 While this does not exhaust the
potential range of Establishment Clause concerns, it does suggest
a repeated tension between "too much" and "not enough" public
religion. Put another way, the Court has struggled to reconcile
the notion that religion has been part of our public life and, if it is
not to be disadvantaged in the market place of ideas, must
continue to be part of our public life, with the recognition that
government involvement with religion presents dangers for
dissenting faiths, nonbelievers and even that faith which
government seeks to promote or accommodate.
"Accommodationist" and "separationist" approaches to the
Establishment Clause can be seen as competing assessments of,
and responses to, these concerns. Although they may be seen as
two separate schools, they are more accurately viewed as opposing
ends of a continuum with one's place on that continuum
determined by one's assessment of the proper role of faith in
public life.
Although "neutrality" is often seen as a distinct category of
Establishment Clause analysis, 54 I prefer to see neutrality as an
approach informed by, and designed to achieve, a particular
substantive view of disestablishment. In and of itself, neutrality
makes sense only in light of ground rules, i.e., some sense of that
state of affairs with respect to which we must be neutral. 55 Where
you think that baseline should be is likely to be determined by
what you think disestablishment is supposed to be. Some
scholars, retired Justice O'Connor, and, occasionally, the Court,
have sometimes tried to root neutrality in the absence of impact
on religious choices. As we will see, this does not work.
III. THE SEPARATIONIST ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE
Separationism calls for some substantial isolation of religion
from government 56 and, at least in its stronger forms,
53. Van Orden, 125 S. Ct. at 2859.
54. See, e.g., Arnold H. Loewy, The Positive Reality and Normative
Virtues of a "Neutral" Establishment Clause, 41 BRANDEIS L.J. 533, 533 (2003)
(claiming theories of Establishment Clause jurisprudence are characterized
by "separationist," "accommodationist," and "neutrality").
55. See Ravitch, supra note 33, at 492.
56. In referring to "separationists," I mean those jurists and scholars who
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affirmatively argues that separation of church and state does -
and should - result in a secular public square. 57 Proponents of
this view are likely to be favorably disposed to Thomas Jefferson's
metaphor of a "wall of separation" between church and state.58
The Supreme Court has, from time to time, called for such
strong degrees of separation. Most famously, in Everson v. Board
of Education,59 Justice Black wrote that "[t]he First Amendment
has erected a wall between church and state. That wall must be
kept high and impregnable. We could not approve the slightest
breach."60
Separationism necessarily involves a set of beliefs about the
role of religion in public life and the impact (or lack thereof) of the
exclusion of religion from the public square. There is a tradition
of supporting separationist approaches to establishment on the
grounds that it is beneficial to religion.61  Professor Gey, for
example, emphasizes that secularism allows religion to flourish in
a "vibrant private sector. '6 2  Separationists more frequently
emphasize the supposedly divisive nature of religion 63 and the
impact of state support for majority religions - or religion
argue for a relatively thoroughgoing divide between the state and religion.
Of course, virtually any norm of nonestablishment will require some degree
of separation.
57. See, e.g., Gey, supra note 8; Suzanna Sherry, Enlightening the
Religion Clauses, 7 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 473 (1996); Sullivan, supra note
17, at 195. However, not all separationists insist that isolation be extreme or
complete. See Douglas Laycock, The Many Meanings of Separation, 70 U.
CHI. L. REV. 1667, 1687-88 (2003).
58. However, its contemporary use may be quite different than the sense
in which Jefferson used the term. DANIEL L. DREISBACH, THOMAS JEFFERSON
AND THE WALL OF SEPARATION BETWEEN CHURCH AND STATE (2002) (arguing
that Jefferson was concerned with institutional separation at the federal
level, while contemporary usage calls for complete separation of religious and
civil government at all levels).
59. 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
60. Id. at 18.
61. See Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 711-12 (2002) (Souter,
J., dissenting).
62. See Gey, supra note 29, at 1025. However, the notion that religion
may flourish "in private" is one on which not all theologians or sociologists of
religion agree.
63. See Gey, supra note 29, at 1013 (religion "offers unity only for those
who convert"); see also Zelman, 536 U.S. at 715-16 (Souter, J., dissenting),
724-27 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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generally - on dissenters. 64 Separationists are more likely to see
religion as uniquely contentious and secularism as religiously
neutral.
Even in its heyday, the wall of separation was never as high
and impregnable as might be imagined. Nevertheless, the
metaphor of separation has occupied a significant place in the
public imagination and, in the past, the Court often seemed
concerned with the need to quarantine the state against religious
activities and sentiments, seeking, for example, to prevent
government funding from finding its way to uses too closely
associated with religious practices.65
Of course, separationists often couch their arguments in
terms of neutrality. In so doing, the baseline is most often the
absence of any government involvement with religion. Any
attempt to accommodate or facilitate religion, no matter how
secular the status quo may be, is a deviation from neutrality.
Secularism, on this view, is the thing.
Although remarkably malleable, the Lemon test, in its use of
a disaggregated effects clause, arguably leads to separationist
results. If one begins with the status quo and then asks if a
governmental action advances or inhibits religion, then it is easy
to conclude that any introduction (or tolerance) of religion in the
public square impermissibly "advances" religion.66 Similarly, if a
state action must have a "secular" purpose, any attempt to level
the field by restoring religion where it has been excluded can be
64. See, e.g., Van Orden v. Perry, 125 S. Ct. 2854, 2881 (2005) (Stevens,
J., dissenting); Frank S. Ravitch, Locke v. Davey and the Lose-Lose Scenario:
What Davey Could Have Said But Didn't, 39 TULSA L. REV. 255, 260 (2004);
Steven H. Shifrin, Liberalism and the Establishment Clause, 78 CHI. KENT. L.
REV. 714, 727 (2003).
65. For example, Justice Souter has characterized the period from 1947
to 1968 as one in which "the basic principle of no aid to religion through
school benefits was unquestioned." Zelman, 536 U.S. at 688 (2002) (Souter,
J., concurring). Even after 1968 until sometime in the late 90s, Justice
Souter believed the Court took the case to ensure that government aid to
religious institutions was not diverted to religious uses or, at least, remained
insubstantial. See id. at 688-89.
66. See Douglas Laycock, Formal, Substantive and Disaggregated
Neutrality, 39 DEPAUL L. REV. 993, 993 (1993). The Court has never clearly
declared a state law or regulation unconstitutional because it inhibited
religion. See James R. Beattie, Jr., Taking Liberalism and Religious Liberty
Seriously: Shifting Our Notion of Toleration From Locke to Mill, 43 CATH.
LAw., 367, 397 n.130 (2004).
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seen as impermissible. 67
Although there are arguably four Justices on the Court who
are strongly separationist, we will see that there are significant
areas of Establishment Clause jurisprudence in which a majority
has abandoned, or substantially discounted, the separationist
approach.
IV. THE ACCOMMODATIONIST ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE
At the opposite pole is a view often termed
"accommodationist." This approach suggests that there are areas
in which government may affirmatively facilitate or even
encourage religion.
There are certain "weak" forms of accommodation. For
example, even persons with a largely separationist orientation
might permit a certain degree of accommodation - most often for
activities they characterize as "ceremonial deism." Justice Black,
for example, thought it acceptable to encourage school children
and others to recite historical documents notwithstanding some
religious content or to sing officially espoused anthems "which
include the composer's professions of faith in a Supreme Being...
,"68 In his view, such "patriotic or ceremonial occasions" did not
amount to a religious exercise. 69
More than one commentator has pointed out that there is
more ceremony than deism in these proclamations. 70 A rule that
permits religious expression only when it is sufficiently diluted to
be nearly unrecognizable or, as Justice Thomas has noted, is
sufficiently ritualized and commonplace as to no longer be taken
67. However, the Court, and various justices have, from time to time,
seen the flaw in applying Lemon in this way. See, e.g., Wallace v. Jaffree, 472
U.S. 38, 83 (1985) (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("It is disingenuous to look for a
purely secular purpose when the manifest objective of a statute is to facilitate
the free exercise of religion by lifting a government-imposed burden.").
68. Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 435 n.21 (1962).
69. Id. A bit more expansively, Justice O'Connor proposed a four-prong
test for governmental references to accommodation of religion, arguing that
such expressions would be most likely to pass constitutional muster if the
practice is 1) historic and ubiquitous, 2) does not involve worship or prayer, 3)
does not refer to a particular religion, and 4) has minimal religious context.
See Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 33-45 (2004)
(O'Connor, J., concurring).
70. Gabrie A. Moens, The Menace of Neutrality In Religion, 2004 BYU L.
REV. 535, 568 (2004).
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seriously,71 may wind up accommodating only that which no one
really wants. If "ceremonial deism" exhausted the
accommodationist landscape, there would be little worth arguing
about.
One stronger form of accommodationism would not require
evenhandedness between "religion" and "irreligion." Often
referred to as non-preferentialism, this view of government may
promote religion generally as long as it does not prefer one sect
over another.
One of the clearest expressions of this view was most recently
advanced by Justice Scalia in his McCreary dissent, joined by
Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Thomas. 72 For Justice Scalia,
not only is religion not to be excluded from the public square, but
it is to be encouraged.73 He flatly rejects the Court's frequent
recital that the First Amendment mandates neutrality between
"religion and non-religion. '74  He sees no problem with
acknowledging the God of monotheism even if this means the
"disregard of polytheists . . . believers in unconcerned deities ...
[and] devout atheists. '75 Although such acknowledgment cannot
be entirely nondenominational, neutrality requires only that
government may not favor one monotheistic religion over another.
This view has never clearly commanded a majority of the Court in
any case. 76
But even if one does not identify nonpreferentialism among
sects as the sine qua non of disestablishment, accommodationist
approaches to the Establishment Clause will strive to find room
71. Van Orden v. Perry, 125 S. Ct. 2854, 2866 (2005) (Thomas, J.,
concurring) ("[I]n a seeming attempt to balance out its willingness to consider
almost any acknowledgment of religion an establishment, in other cases
Members of this Court have concluded that the term or symbol at issue has
no religious meaning by virtue of its ubiquity or rote ceremonial invocation.").
72. McCreary County, Ky. v. ACLU of Ky., 125 S. Ct. 2722, 2757-64
(2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 2753.
76. Nor has it been championed in the academy although a few scholars
have advocated something like an accommodationist approach. See, e.g.,
Michael W. McConnell, Accommodation of Religion, 1985 S. CT. REV. 1, 5-9
(1986); Rodney K. Smith, Nonpreferentialism In Establishment Clause
Analysis: A Response to Professor Laycock, 65 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 245, 247-63
(1991).
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for religion in the public square. These approaches will also be
described as a form of "neutrality," with the concern no longer
being deviation from a secular baseline, but with the need to give
religion an "even shake" in the public arena.
Those trending toward accommodation, and away from
separation, are more likely to see religion as no less contentious
than other strongly held views and less likely to see secularism as
religiously neutral. This may be rooted in a belief that religion is
a good thing and ought to be encouraged. 77 Alternatively, or in
addition, it may be predicated upon the recognition that to keep
religion out of public life is to place it at a disadvantage.
For example, in Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, the Court upheld
a school voucher plan that permitted the vouchers to be used at
sectarian schools. 78 Although both Chief Justice Rehnquist and
Justice Souter claimed to be concerned with government
neutrality toward the religious views of its citizens, they disagreed
wildly over what evenhandedness entailed.
The Chief Justice was unconcerned that 96% of voucher
recipients had enrolled in religious schools, observing that there
were alternatives to the Cleveland public schools (other than the
vouchers) that were not religious in nature.79  He found it
constitutionally irrelevant that a vast majority of program
benefits went to religious schools. For Chief Justice Rehnquist,
the baseline was neither the existing state of affairs prior to
adoption of the program (i.e., government aid only to secular
public schools) nor some presumed allocation of benefits among
secular and sectarian options or between differing sects.
Convinced as he was that individuals were free to choose among
secular and sectarian options, he concluded that the program was
neutral.80 For the Chief Justice, in Zelman, the baseline was
something approximating the absence of government influence on
77. See, e.g., John H. Garvey, An Anti-Liberal Argument For Religious
Freedom, 7 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 275 (1996).
78. 536 U.S. 639 (2002).
79. Id. at 658.
80. Id. at 703 (Souter, J., dissenting). Justice Souter expressed concern
that students who wish to use the scholarships might have no alternative but
to use them at "established" religious schools not of their own denomination.
Id. But, for the Chief Justice and the majority, the key point appears to have
been that the state did nothing to affect the denominational distribution of
religious schools.
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private choices.
Justice Souter, in dissent, on the other hand, argued that, in
assessing neutrality, it was proper to consider only the choices
made by voucher recipients because only in that way could one
conclude whether there was a true secular alternative regarding
the use of those funds.8' The existence of pre-existing secular
alternatives or the extent to which government, as opposed to the
nature and extent of private religious affiliations, brought about
the distribution of scholarship use presumably did not matter.
For Justice Souter, the baseline was the status quo - which was
presumed to be neutral.
Justice Souter accused the majority of formalism,8 2 certainly a
cardinal sin for the legally sophisticated. But the Zelman
majority was engaged not in formalism (whatever that may be),
but in the identification of a different form of baseline reflecting
different assumptions about the proper relationship between state
and religion. The Chief Justice was relatively unconcerned about
what the choices regarding use of the scholarship turned out to be
or the extent to which they might be influenced by an existing
array of religious choices that were presumably uninfluenced by
government policy.
He was also unconcerned with the promotion of a common
(and secular) public discourse or with the supposedly uniquely
divisive nature of religion. The fact that opportunities for
religious education may not be available to students of minority
faiths was not problematic,83 as long as it was not the product of
government action.
Justice Souter was more concerned that government policy
not "reinforce" the minority status of certain of its beneficiaries.
He emphasized what he saw as the divisive and disuniting
properties of religion.8 4 The choice of baseline and prioritization of
concerns can be seen as reflecting accommodationist and
separationist views of the Establishment Clause.
81. Id. at 694 (Souter, J., dissenting).
82. Id.
83. Id. at 658 ("The constitutionality of a neutral educational aid
program simply does not turn on whether and why, in a particular area, at a
particular time, most private schools are run by religious organizations, or
most recipients choose to use the aid at a religious school.").
84. Id. at 715-16 (Souter, J., dissenting).
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The same concern can be seen with respect to public funding
of what the Court regards as private speech. In Rosenberger v.
Rectors and Visitors of the University of Virginia,85 the Court held
that a public university could not exclude a religious group from
services generally available to student organizations. For
example, Justice Kennedy, writing for the majority, observed that
the Court had (or at least had now) "rejected the position that the
Establishment Clause even justifies, much less requires, a refusal
to extend free speech rights to religious speakers who participate
in broad-reaching government programs neutral in design. '86 To
do otherwise would be to exercise censorship "to ensure that all
student writings and publications meet some baseline standard of
secular orthodoxy. 87
Justice Souter and the dissenters argued for a baseline
centered upon "the destructive consequences of mixing
government and religion . . . [and to] protect religion from a
corrupting dependence on support from government.188 In other
words, the baseline is separation.
V. THE AMBITIOUS ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE
A. The "Death" of Separation
While Justice Black would have built a wall of separation
between church and state that was "high and impregnable," the
past twenty years or so have seen, if not its demolition, at least a
significant aeration of that wall. Although reports of the death of
separation8 9 may have been greatly exaggerated, the notion that
religion must be quarantined from public spaces has been
considerably weakened.
B. Public Funding Cases
As noted earlier, for a number of years, the Court generally
sought to prevent the use of government funds for, at least, the
85. 51 U.S. 819 (1995).
86. Id. at 839.
87. Id. at 844.
88. Id. at 891 (Souter, J., dissenting).
89. Ira Lupu, The Lingering Death of Separationism, 62 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 230 (1992).
2006] A MORE MODEST ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE 19
religious activities of sectarian institutions.90 More recently, the
Court has shown a broad willingness to permit government
funding of faith based services as long as the choice of those
alternatives was made by an individual and there remains a
private secular alternative. It has upheld tax deductions for
expenses connected with sending children to private schools,
including religious ones, 91 educational grants to be used at
sectarian colleges,92 sign language interpreters to be used by a
student at a sectarian school,93 grants to religiously affiliated
organizations for sexuality and pregnancy counseling,94 funding
for remedial education in religious schools, 95 and direct aid for
instructional materials to pervasively sectarian schools. 96
This line of cases arguably culminated in Zelman v. Simmons-
Harris97 in which, as noted earlier, the Court upheld Ohio's school
voucher plan permitting families in Cleveland to receive tuition
aid for both secular and sectarian private schools. Because the
program had the valid secular purpose of providing educational
assistance to poor children in a demonstrably failing public school
system, and provided assistance directly to citizens who directed
the aid to religious schools wholly as a result of their own
independent and private choice, the Court held that government
aid to religious schools did not violate the Establishment Clause.98
While Zelman may not itself have constituted a sharp
departure from the Court's then recent decrees, it faced and
rather conclusively rejected much of what was still thought to
restrict aid to religious institutions. Government aid was
permitted to flow to these schools regardless of the fact that they
engaged in religious instruction. No steps were taken to segregate
government funded secular activity from religious instructions.
Although the Court emphasized the need for a secular alternative,
it was untroubled by the fact that an overwhelming percentage of
90. See Part IV and accompanying notes.
91. Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388 (1983).
92. Witters v. Washington Dept. of Serv. for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481
(1986).
93. Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills, 509 U.S. 1 (1993).
94. Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589 (1987).
95. Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203 (1997).
96. Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793 (2000).
97. 536 U.S. 639 (2002).
98. Id. at 662-63.
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families using program vouchers employed them at religious
schools. 99
There remains a significant minority on the Court who would
read the Establishment Clause to permit, as the Everson Court
said, even "[n]o tax in any amount, large or small" to support
overtly religious activity. 100 But, for now, nonestablishment does
not seem to prevent the mere use of public money for religious
purposes as long as that money is available to all religious and
secular alternatives and is directed to its ultimate recipient by
private choice. As one commentator has noted, "the
Establishment Clause part of this fight is over."101  "Equal-
treatment" accommodation has prevailed over separation. This
reflects an increased willingness to conclude that the secular is
not religiously neutral and, however divisive religion might be, to
see individual choice to commit funds to religious purposes as
consistent with government neutrality.
C. "Private" Speech in Public Places
The Court has also permitted substantial religious expression
in proximity to government or, more specifically, in places or fora
that government funds or controls. Although these cases have
generally been doctrinal hybrids, in which Establishment Clause
concerns were potentially in conflict with free speech rights, once
again the trend has been away from separation and toward
accommodation.
For example, the Court has held that student religious groups
were entitled to equal access to university facilities, generally
available to other student groups. 10 2 The Court has also upheld
the Federal Equal Access Act, which guarantees student religious
groups access to school facilities made generally available to other
extracurricular groups during noninstructional time. 103
It has held that public school facilities that were available to
99. Id. at 657-59.
100. Id. at 686-87 (Souter, J., dissenting) (quoting Everson v. Bd. of Educ.
of the Twp. of Ewing, 330 U.S. 1, 16 (1947)).
101. Douglas Laycock, Theology Scholarships, the Pledge of Allegiance,
and Religious Liberty: Avoiding the Extremes but Missing the Liberty, 118
HARv. L. REV. 155, 167 (2004).
102. Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981).
103. Bd. of Educ. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226 (1990).
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the public during nonschool hours must be made available to a
church that wished to show a film on child rearing, and to a
Christian children's club.' 04 It held that the state must permit a
cross on a state owned plaza that was a traditional public fora,
open generally to private speech. 105
As we have seen, in Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of the
University of Virginia, the Court held that the University of
Virginia could not deny funding to a religious group seeking to
publish a Christian magazine where funding for this purpose was
made available to other student groups. 106 Once again, the Court
declined to regard the secular as religiously neutral and refused to
see permitting private religious choices in public spaces as
impermissibly divisive.
Finally, in Good News Club v. Milford Central School,107 the
Court held that a school that allowed after-school use of its
building by any group promoting the moral and character
development of children could not deny use to a Christian club.
The Court found that the program planned by the religious group
fit within the purpose for which the building was made available,
notwithstanding that it would involve Bible memorization,
Christian teaching and the singing of hymns. Justice Thomas was
untroubled by Justice Souter's suggestion that the program
involved worship, observing that it still constituted moral
instruction and rejecting the suggestion that "reliance on
Christian principles taints moral and character instruction in a
way that other foundations for thought or viewpoints do not."108
D. Persistence of the Secular State
Some scholars have either celebrated, or lamented, these
developments as the death of separationism 109 and the triumph of
formal neutrality." 0 The Court seems to have moved to a baseline
104. Lamb's Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384 (1993).
105. Capital Square Review and Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753
(1995).
106. 515 U.S. 819 (1995).
107. 533 U.S. 98 (2001).
108. Id. at 111.
109. Lupu, supra note 89, at 230.
110. Ravitch, supra note 33, at 489-90; Loewy, supra note 54, at 533-34;
Salamanca, supra note 33, at 575.
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built upon something more akin to a notion of substantive
neutrality, i.e., a concern that government not take sides; that it
not place its weight behind the religious choices of its citizens. 111
Thus the baseline becomes the treatment of analogous secular
activities. 112 In the era of a less porous wall of separation and in
the heyday of Lemon, the Court was more likely to see the naked
public square as the pertinent baseline.
It is clear that there is no longer, if there ever was, a "wall of
separation" dividing religion and government into two worlds that
may not meet. But theocracy is not yet upon us. When the
government speaks, the Court has remained adamant regarding
the exclusion of religious points of view.
E. The Government Has But One Voice
Although the Court has allowed significant interaction
between religion and government in the areas of public aid and
private speech in certain public fora, government speech must
remain relatively religion-free. 113  For example, in Stone v.
Graham114 the Court invalidated a state requirement that the Ten
Commandments be. posted in public classrooms. In Edwards v.
Aguillard,115 it struck down a law requiring schools to teach
"Creation Science" as well as evolutionary theory.
More recently, in McCreary County v. American Civil
111. Professor Laycock has described this as the "no aid" non-
discrimination principle. Laycock, supra note 101, at 165.
112. The trend may or may not have stalled with the Court's decision in
Locke v. Davey, in which the Court held that the state of Washington could
refuse to permit the use of a generally available. scholarship program to fund
preparation for the ministry without violating a student's free exercise rights.
See 540 U.S. 712 (2004). While some scholars have argued that Locke
permits, but does not require, state discrimination in favor of a secular state,
see, e.g., Laura S. Underkuffler, Davey and the Limits of Equality, 40 TULSA
L. REV. 267, 268, 272 (2004), Locke may also be seen as a simple permitting of
a state to fund core religious functions closely associated with the running of
a church, i.e., the training of its ministers. See 540 U.S. at 719-20. Locke
may also represent the Court's aversion to the argument that the government
might be required to fund religious activities. See Frederick Mark Gedicks,
The Establishment Clause Gag Reflex, 2004 BYU L. REV. 995, 1001 (2004).
113. Government may, under certain circumstances, communicate
"objectively" about religion, although the legal rigor required to do so may
often operate as a disincentive to even try.
114. 449 U.S. 39 (1980).
115. 482 U.S. 578 (1987).
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Liberties Union, the posting of the Ten Commandments, even
when accompanied by materials designed to emphasize their
historic role in the development of law and, even when displayed
in conjunction with secular materials, was held to violate the
Establishment Clause."16
Religious discourse is excluded from the public square not
only when the government is the speaker, but when it sponsors -
or a reasonable observer might conclude that it has sponsored -
religious speech. If government permits religious speech in a
context where it exercises control over the message, or otherwise
facilitates "religious expression" in a way that may be
characterized as not neutral, courts may conclude that it is
government sponsored, and therefore prohibited.
For example, in Wallace v. Jaffree,1 7 the Court struck down
an Alabama statute authorizing a daily period of silence in public
schools for meditation or voluntary prayer because, in its view of
the law's history and context, the law's purpose was to endorse
religion."18 In Lee v. Weisman, 1 9 the Court held that a school
could not provide for nonsectarian prayer by a clergyperson at a
graduation ceremony because the prayer in question would bear
"the imprint of the state" and be viewed as a prescription or
endorsement of theistic, albeit rather generic, religious belief.120
In Santa Fe Independent School District v. Doe,121 the Court held
that even student-led and student initiated prayers at high school
football games, at least where conducted pursuant to a school
policy authorizing an invocation of some sort, amounted to an
unconstitutional endorsement of religion.
The idea of equality between religious and secular speech,
ascendant when it comes to funding and private speech not too
116. 125 S. Ct. 2722. Although, as noted earlier, on the same day that
McCreary was decided, the Court upheld a different, and somewhat older,
display of the Ten Commandments in Van Orden v. Perry, 125 S. Ct. 2854
(2005). Justice Breyer's concurrence describing his swing vote, explained
that his vote was based, not on a view that the government may engage in
religious expression, but that no such expression had taken place. Id. at
2861.
117. 472 U.S. 38 (1985).
118. Id. at 59.
119. 505 U.S. 577 (1992).
120. Id. at 590.
121. 530 U.S. 290, 308 (2000).
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closely associated with the government, does not apply when the
government is speaking or to private speech that might be
attributed to the government by a hypothetical "reasonable
observer."1 22  Although the Court has moved toward equal
treatment in cases of public funding and private speech on public
property that is sufficiently "removed" from the state, 123 it has
continued to apply different First Amendment standards to
religious and nonreligious expression too closely associated with
the state.
F. Endorsement Neutrality
The idea of substantive neutrality, most prominently
advanced in the academy by Professor Douglas Laycock, 124 is that
the government should refrain from doing things that influence
citizens' religious choices. 125 Choosing this form of neutrality
reflects a determination that the Establishment Clause is about
protecting religious choice. Extending this form of neutrality to
choices between religion and "irreligion" reflects a further
judgment about the scope of the liberty that is to be protected.
On this view, it may sometimes be necessary to separate and
sometimes be necessary to accommodate, depending on which
serves the goal of even-handedness. For example, Professor
Laycock has argued that separation is required in addressing
questions like recitation of the Pledge of Allegiance, with its claim
that our nation is "under God." To sponsor recitation of the
122. Gey, supra note 8, at 1888; see also Ira C. Lupu, Government
Messages and Government Money: Santa Fe, Mitchell v. Helms and the Arc of
the Establishment Clause, 42 WM. & MARY L. REV. 771, 802-04 (2001) (noting
separationist approach in government speech).
123. See Part V.B and and V.C and accompanying notes.
124. Douglas Laycock, Religious Liberty as Liberty, 197 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL
ISSUES, 313, 320 (1996). Others have formulated similar ideas in different
terms. See, e.g., Keith Werthan, Navigating the New Neutrality: School
Vouchers, the Pledge and Limits of Purposive Establishment Clause, 41
BRANDEIS L.J. 603 (2003); David Cole, Faith and Funding: Toward an
Expressivist Model of the Establishment Clause, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 559 (2002).
125. Laycock, supra note 66, at 1001-02 ("[The religion clauses require
government to minimize the extent to which it either encourages or
discourages belief or disbelief, practice or nonpractice, observance or
nonobservance." Religion "is to be left as wholly to private choice as anything
can be.").
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existence of God would be to take sides. 126 Accommodation is
required with respect to the government scholarships that permit
students to choose their own course of study. 127 Because the
decision to use those is made by the student, the state has not
taken sides.
On the Court, substantive neutrality is, perhaps, most clearly
expressed by recently retired Justice O'Connor's "nonendorsement
principle."' 28 As framed by Justice O'Connor, religious expression
by the state is forbidden when its purpose or effect 129 is to endorse
religion or nonreligion, or one religion over another.
Endorsement, in her view, "'sends a message to non-adherents
that they are outsiders, not full members of the political
community."' 30
Government must not make a person's religious beliefs
"relevant in any way to a person's standing in the political
community" by conveying a message "that religion or a particular
religious belief is favored or preferred."'13 1 Whether or not
endorsement has occurred is to be determined by a reasonable
observer, familiar with the text and background of both the First
126. Laycock, supra note 101, at 160-66.
127. Professor Laycock filed amici briefs supporting the view that the
state may not exclude majors in devotional theology from an otherwise
unrestricted scholarship program and the view that public schools may not
lead students in the Pledge. See Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712 (2004); Elk
Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1 (2004); Laycock, supra note
101, at 160.
128. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 687-88 (1984) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring) (citing Sch. Dist. of Abington Twp., Pa. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203
(1963)).
129. In McCreary, the Court came close to suggesting that impermissible
endorsement will almost always have a "purpose" to advance religion or,
more accurately, the "reasonable observer" would perceive a purpose to take
sides on religious questions. 125 S. Ct. at 2735 ("If someone in the
government hides religious motive so well that the 'objective observer' ...
cannot see it, then without something more the government does not make a
divisive announcement that in itself amounts to taking sides."). But see
Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 707 (2002) (Stevens, J., dissenting)
("And it is entirely irrelevant that the State did not deliberately design the
network of private schools for the sale of channeling money into religious
institutions.").
130. County of Allegheny v. ACLU, Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, 492 U.S.
573, 625 (1989) (quoting Lynch, 465 U.S. at 688).
131. Id. at 593, 625 (quoting Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 70 (1985)
(O'Connor J., concurring)).
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Amendment and of the challenged practice.132
This notion of nonestablishment is rather demanding. Justice
Breyer, without apparent irony, summed up its ambitious scope in
his Van Orden concurrence. The religion clauses, he says, are to
promote "the fullest scope of religious liberty" and "tolerance for
all."133  They seek to avoid "divisiveness" by maintaining
"'separation of church and state."' 134  But interpretation of the
clauses must manage not to "purge from the public sphere all that
in any way partakes of the religious" because that, too, would
"promote the kind of social conflict the Establishment Clause
seeks to avoid."135 The government must neither 'engage in [ ] or
compel,"' nor do anything resulting in excessive "interference with,
or promotion of' religion. 136 It must, moreover, maintain this
Solomonic neutrality not only among 'sects"' but between
"'religion and nonreligion."' 137  Not surprisingly, Justice Breyer
can conceive of no test that might tell us whether government has
strayed from the narrow path to which it must keep. 38 One tires
just reading his description of the requisite rigor.
Thus, government is not to endorse, or to be reasonably
perceived as endorsing not only any particular religion or religion
in general, but nonbelief as well. 139 While certain governmental
expressions may be excused as ceremonial deism 140 or even as de
minimis, 14 1 unconstitutional endorsement need not involve any
132. Some courts have seen the endorsement test as a refinement of the
first two prongs in Lemon (i.e., "purpose" and "effect"). See Indiana Civil
Liberties Union v. O'Bannon, 259 F.3d 766, 770 (7th Cir. 2000). Other courts
have considered it to be a refinement of the effects prong. See ACLU v.
Ashbrook, 35 F.3d 484, 503 (6th Cir. 2004). Again, in McCreary, the Court
came close to eliding the two, suggesting that there is unlikely to be an
"effect" without a "purpose."







139. McCreary County, Ky. v. ACLU of Ky., 125 S. Ct. 2722, 2733 (2005);
Sch. Dist. of Abington Twp., Pa. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 225 (1963).
140. Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 792 (1983) ("[T]he practice of
opening legislative sessions with prayer has become part of the fabric of our
society.").
141. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 683 (1983) ("[Wlhatever benefit
[from municipal display of creche] there is to one faith or religion or to all
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but the blandest and most brief theistic sentiment. 142 It can be
entirely symbolic in the sense of having no consequence other than
mere exposure. 143 Thus, in Lee v. Weisman, Justice Kennedy and
the majority concluded that having to sit in respectful silence
during a nondenominational prayer was an unacceptable
burden. 144
This prohibition against the government taking sides applies
almost without regard to the degree of burden that is placed on
dissenters 145 or the likelihood that it will have any real impact on
religious choices. 146 It can even consist of an "endorsement" that
expressly denies that it is any such thing, merely acknowledging
religious sentiment or belief as a source of our democracy or as
something which "just happens" to be or to have been believed by
a majority or significant portion of us at all or some times in our
religions, is indirect, remote, and incidental.").
142. See Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 581-82 (1992) (considering a
prayer, offered by a Rabbi, that did no more than thank and call upon a "God"
and "Lord" about whom no further details were offered, to be an
endorsement); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 422 (1962) (finding
unconstitutional a prayer that said "Almighty God, we acknowledge our
dependence upon Thee, and we beg Thy blessings upon us, our parents, our
teachers and our Country").
143. One separationist scholar has observed:
Many of the state actions the Supreme Court has deemed to violate the
Constitution over the years have involved intangible establishments. That is,
constitutional violations have often come in the form of state actions that do
not actually force anyone to do anything against their personal faith, but
rather simply communicate that the government favors some form of religion
in the abstract.
Gey, supra note 8, at 1910.
144. Justice Kennedy, writing for the majority, acknowledged that
"students may consider it an odd measure of justice to be subjected during
the course of their educations to ideas deemed offensive and irreligious, but to
be denied a brief, formal prayer service ceremony that the school offers in
return." Lee, 505 U.S. at 591. He conceded that "to endure social isolation or
even anger may be the price of conscience or nonconformity," id. at 597-98,
but that exposure to this brief formal and nondenominational prayer was "too
high an exactment" to be permitted.
145. As Justice Thomas has observed, students exposed to what was taken
as a state-sponsored prayer at a graduation ceremony are not 'coerced to
pray' but "[a]t most, ... are 'coerced' into possibly appearing to assent to the
prayer." Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 47 (2004)
(Thomas, J., concurring).
146. See, e.g., Engel, 370 U.S. at 442 (Douglas, J., concurring)
(acknowledging that nondenominational prayer does not establish religion).
28 ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITY LAWREVIEW [Vol. 12:1
history.' 47 It need not include an argument that the point of view
expressed constitutes exclusive truth or an express claim that any
other point of view is wrong. 148 We require government to not
refrain, notably from coercion, but from a rather exaggerated
notion of insensitivity. 149 Endorsement, it turns out, can be very
slight. 150
The scope of "nonendorsement" theory can be illustrated by
consideration of the different senses of the term embraced by it.
Shortly following Justice O'Connor's promulgation of the
endorsement list, Stephen Smith identified at least four forms of
endorsement, roughly labeled exclusive preferment of a belief,
endorsement of the truthfulness of a belief, endorsement of the
147. McCreary County, Ky. v. ACLU of Ky., 125 S. Ct. 2722, 2739 (2005)
("Foundation of American Law and Government" exhibit included Ten
Commandments in display with other documents thought significant in
historical foundation of American government).
148. Arguably no modern Establishment Clause case considered by the
Court involves such a claim, other than in the sense that facilitating
invocations of God implies that there is one and that those who say there is
not must be wrong. For example, Edwards v. Aguillard and its progeny
largely consist of cases invalidating government communication that
evolution is a "theory" and that some persons have different beliefs regarding
the origin of life. See 482 U.S. 578, 581 (1987).
149. For example, in Doe v. Beaumont Indep. Sch. Dist., 240 F.3d 462 (5th
Cir. 2001), the court held that an issue of fact existed as to whether a
volunteer "Clergy In the Schools" counseling program was an establishment,
notwithstanding that the clergy were required to speak from a secular
perspective and wore no religious garb. Apparently their mere identity was
problematic. Upon remand, the district court found that the program
constituted an establishment. Id. at 464.
150. See Van Orden v. Perry, 125 S. Ct. 2854, 2866 (2005) (Thomas, J.,
concurring) ("[T]his Court's precedent permits even the slightest public
recognition of religion to constitute establishment of religion."); Lee v.
Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 637 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("[Slurely our
social conventions ... have not coarsened to the point that anyone who does
not stand on his chair and shout obscenities can reasonably be deemed to
have assented to everything said in his presence."). Some have argued that
the extent to which a perception of a government message is context
dependent renders the whole concept of endorsement incomprehensible. See,
e.g., B. Jessie Hill, Putting Religious Symbolism In Context: A Linguistic
Critique of the Endorsement Test, 104 MICH. L. REV. 491 (2005). Others have
critiqued the notion that government action should be understood in terms of
the "message" that it sends. See, e.g., Steven D. Smith, Expressivist
Jurisprudence and the Depletion of Meaning, 60 MD. L. REV. 506 (2001);
Matthew D. Adler, Expressive Theories of Law: A Skeptical Overview, 148 U.
PA. L. REV. 1363 (2000).
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value of a belief, and recognition that many have believed. 151
Following the Court's decisions in McCreary and Van Orden, it
seems that a slim majority of the Court believes that the first
three are all forbidden by the Establishment Clause.
There seems to be no doubt that if the government claimed
(explicitly) that all believers are irrational (exclusive preferment)
or that "Jesus saves" (endorsement of truthfulness), the
Establishment Clause would be violated. It is hard to see how
communication of the value of a particular belief would steer clear
of Establishment Clause difficulty, given, for example,
invalidation of laws providing for moments of silence, 152 informing
students of alternative views of the origins of life 153 or
acknowledging the importance of the Ten Commandments 154 in
the development of the western legal tradition. It may be that
only where, as in Van Orden, a court (or at least the decisive vote
on a court) can conclude no claim is made regarding the value of a
belief, that a government statement concerning that belief - at
least if it is religious - can stand. Because, as we saw in
McCreary and Kitzmiller, endorsement may be implicit 155 - may,
in fact, be found even where it has been disclaimed - one wonders
how often endorsement in the fourth sense (a recognition that
many have believed) can be permitted.
VI. THE FAILURE OF ENDORSEMENT NEUTRALITY
A. Nonendorsement's Frustrated Ambitions
This is a sensitivity at war with itself. If vague and
noncoercive references to God are problematic because an
objective observer might perceive the government to be endorsing
a perspective about religion that she does not share and will,
therefore, feel "disfavored," then the presentation of a systematic
151. Stephen D. Smith, Symbols, Perceptions and Doctrinal Illusions:
Establishment Neutrality and the "No Endorsement" Test, 86 MICH. L. REV.
266, 276-77 (1987).
152. Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 40-41 (1985).
153. Edwards, 482 U.S. at 581.
154. McCreary County, Ky. v. ACLU of Ky., 125 S. Ct. 2722, 2728-29
(2005).
155. Id. at 2731; Kitzmiller v. Dover Area Sch. Dist., 400 F. Supp. 2d 707,
708-09 (M.D. Pa. 2005).
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worldview that rigorously excludes any mention of God should
also raise Establishment Clause concerns. When we seek to
exclude no one, neutral ground may turn out to be a fairly small
patch.
Neither the Supreme Court nor lower courts have been eager
to fully explore the implications of this broader form of anti-
establishment. Particularly when government is the speaker, it
has generally been assumed, mostly without explanation, that
Establishment Clause mandates of "neutrality" or
"nonendorsement" are perfectly consistent with government
policies that either explicitly or implicitly adopt secular
approaches to questions and problems where many seek religious
answers.
But whether recognized or not, the failure to see how
activities undertaken with a secular purpose may violate the
"norm" of governmental neutrality toward religion undermines
"nonendorsement" or "substantive neutrality." They fail - and
they fail on their own terms.
B. Government Policies And Practices Implicate Religious
Concerns
The notion that there is a secular realm with which the state
is involved and in which religious concerns are not implicated may
have been accurate when the state was relatively uninvolved with
education and social services. But as soon as the government
begins to care for its citizens and to care about what they should
think, implication of religion is -unavoidable.
In Engel, the majority argued that disestablishment "leave[s]
that purely religious function to the people themselves and to
those the people look to for religious guidance."'156 But the efficacy
of private religious expression is only as strong as the scope of
wholly private spaces will permit.
To the extent that modes of expression become "public" in the
sense that they are financed or perceived to be endorsed by the
government, limiting those modes to "secular" discourse becomes
increasingly problematic. 'Thus, as Professor Donald Gianelli has
pointed out, in a state where all property was public, the
156. 370 U.S. at 435.
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government may have to build churches. 157
While twenty-first century America is far from a socialist
state, the state is an active participant in public discourse, far
more active than it has been for much of the period in which the
Religion Clauses have been in existence. 158 To the extent that the
state's voice (or, as current jurisprudence would have it, any voice
too closely associated with the state) is a large one, what it
chooses to say (or not say) has a disproportionate influence on its
citizen's religious choices.
Schools do much more than teach the "three Rs." There are
few schools which do not, in one way or another, engage students
in discussions about how and what to think about issues such as
sexuality, tolerance for the choices and lifestyles of others,
diversity of races and cultures, the environment, etc.159 One
appellate court recently observed that "education is not merely
about teaching the basics of reading, writing, and arithmetic.
Education serves higher civic and social functions, including the
rearing of children into healthy, productive, and responsible
adults and the cultivation of talented and qualified leaders of
diverse backgrounds."16 0
157. Donald A. Giannella, Religious Liberty, Nonestablishment, and
Doctrinal Development: Part II. The Nonestablishment Principal, 81 HARv. L.
REV. 513, 522-23 (1968); Douglas Laycock, The Underlying Unity of
Separation and Neutrality, 46 EMORY L.J. 43, 49 (1997).
158. See, e.g., Thomas C. Berg, Religious Clause Anti-Theories, 72 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 693, 714 (1997); Michael W. McConnell, Religious Freedom at a
Crossroads, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 115, 137, 161, 183-94 (1992).
159. This "clarification" of values may be mandatory as well as merely
suggestive. More than one teacher certification program requires successful
teaching candidates to exhibit a "commitment to social justice" and the
National Council for Accreditation of Teacher Education has expressly
recognized this as a "disposition" that may be required for accreditation. See,
e.g., Robert "K.C." Johnson, Disposition For Bias, FOUNDATION FOR
INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS IN EDUCATION, May 23, 2005, http://www.thefire.org
/index.php/article/6250.html. At Washington State University, a student
received negative values on "dispositions" requiring him to be "sensitive to
community and cultural norms" and to "appreciat[e] and valu[e] human
diversity" allegedly because he was a self described "conservative Christian"
who did not believe that male and white privilege exist. Press Release,
Foundation for Individual Rights in Education, Education Programs May
Have a 'Disposition' for Censorship (Sept. 21, 2005), http://www.
thefire.org/indexphp/article/6280.html.
160. Fields v. Palmdale Sch. Dist., 427 F.3d 1197, 1209 (9th Cir. 2005),
aff'd, 447 F.3d 1187 (9th Cir. 2006).
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Even where a public school advocates no particular facts or
values contrary to its student's religious beliefs, it will almost
certainly engage in, and at least implicitly promote, a way of
thinking and living in which religion is excluded. If, for example,
a curriculum offers students a set of "tools" by which to facilitate
moral decision-making or choices about sexual activity 161 that may
exclude, or minimize, 162 religious considerations, it is hardly a
stretch to say that such instruction communicates a message that
these perspectives are less important - and are certainly never to
be urged upon others.
Even in the more traditionally "academic" realm, what schools
say - or, again, do not say - about the role of religion in the
nation's history and current affairs have implications for students'
religious life. Throughout most of the twentieth and now into the
twenty-first century, bitter controversy surrounds the fact and
manner of teaching evolution and whether to include alternatives
ranging from "creation science" to "intelligent design."'163
Although public education is the paradigmatic example of
government speech, it is not the only one. As the government has
taken on greater responsibility for the delivery of social services,
what it communicates about, for example, how one escapes
poverty or recovers from addiction, assumes a larger role in the
public's assumptions and beliefs and about how such problems are
to be addressed and what is to be said about them. Religious
social services agencies, such as Catholic Charities and Lutheran
Social Services, have long been accused of becoming increasingly
161. See Gheta v. Nassau County Cmty. Coll., 33 F. Supp. 2d 179, 180
(E.D.N.Y. 1999) (challenging a sexuality course); Grove v. Mead Sch. Dist.
No. 354, 753 F.2d 1528 (9th Cir. 1985) (objecting to a book in an English
literature curriculum).
162. In fact, if what is constitutionally significant is the requirement that
no one be made to feel like an outsider or to believe that the state disapproves
of his or her faith, "establishment" may arise. Even if the publicly expressed
view is that religion is one of many more or less equivalent considerations or
portrayed as something that "some people" believe which may be further
explored outside the formal educational process. Those who believe that duty
to God is paramount will feel that duty has been slighted.
163. See, e.g., Edwards v. Aguillar, 482 U.S. 578, 581 (1987); Epperson v.
Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 98 (1968) (evolution); Kitzmiller v. Dover Area Sch.
Dist., 400 F. Supp. 2d 707, 708 (M.D. Pa. 2005) (intelligent design); Freiler v.
Tangipahoa Parish Bd. of Educ., 185 F.3d 337, 341 (5th Cir. 1999) (creation
science); Scopes v. State, 289 S.W. 363, 363 (Tenn. 1927) (evolution).
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secular as they grow more dependent on government funds. 164
Public spaces, moreover, have always been places in which
the state expresses the values of the community. Plaques, public
art and memorials purport to express and reinforce the values of
the community. While this is not new, the notion that such public
displays not contain any hint of religiosity is, as the ubiquity of
the Ten Commandment memorials such as that at issue in Van
Orden attests. 165
C. Religious Perspectives Are Not Private
One scholar has noted that "[s]eparationism thrived best
when white Anglo-Saxon Protestants of low-level religious
intensity constituted the bulk of our cultural elite."166 As we have
seen in the work of Rawls, Rorty, Macedo, and Gey, these elites
might argue that individuals are allowed to practice religion
freely, in private, but are expected "to put aside their sectarian
loyalties and convictions when acting in their capacities as
citizens."167
This presupposition not only fails to describe how many
regard their faith, it is not religiously neutral. It "takes sides." As
Professor Kathleen Brady has explained, 168 the notion that
religion is a private and individual matter, while informing much
of our Establishment Clause jurisprudence, 169 is most recently
164. See, e.g., Rev. Robert A. Sirico, Taking the "Catholic" out of Catholic
Charities: He Who Pays the Piper Calls the Tune, PHILANTHROPY, Jan. 1,
1998.
165. The display of the Ten Commandments went unchallenged for forty
years. Van Orden v. Perry, 125 S. Ct. 2854, 2870 (2005).
166. Lupu, supra note 89, at 231.
167. Michael W. McConnell, Believers as Equal Citizens, in OBLIGATIONS
OF CITIZENSHIP AND DEMANDS OF FAITH: RELIGIOUS ACCOMMODATION IN
PLURALIST DEMOCRACIES 90, 101 (Nancy L. Rosenblum ed., 2000).
168. Kathleen A. Brady, Fostering Harmony Among the Justices: How
Contemporary Debates in Theology Can Help to Reconcile the Divisions on the
Court Regarding Religious Expression by the State, 75 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
433 (1999).
169. See, e.g., Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 53 (1985) (concluding that
religion is a "product of free and voluntary choice"); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406
U.S. 205, 243 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting in part) (arguing that religion is
"an individual experience"); Everson v. Bd. of Educ. of the Twp. of Ewing, 330
U.S. 1, 39 (1947) (Rutledge, J., dissenting) (discussing that religion is "wholly
private").
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associated with "modern" or "liberal" theology. 170 In accordance
with Kant's "turn to the subject" in modern philosophy and the
corresponding notion that one cannot know the "noumena" or
thing-in-itself, modern theology, following the lead of F.D.E.
Schleiermacher, 171 argued that the source of religion was an
individual, but universal, human experience of feeling an utter
dependence.' 72 If religion is rooted in individual and universal
experiences, then it is ultimately a matter between God and the
individual, with religious communities flowing organically and
naturally from that experience. On this view, the argument
continues, while religion may be expressed in community, there is
little threat to faith by excluding it from the public square because
religious experience is innate. It may be reinforced or developed
in community, but it need not be formed by a community. 173
On the other hand, post-modern theology tends to see religion
as rooted in the particular traditions, history and interaction
within particular communities. 174  These communities are,
moreover, permeable and influenced by the larger culture in
which they exist. 175  Professor Brady writes that "[i]n the
postliberal view, the survival of religion depends on healthy
religious communities whose symbols, rituals, and values can
function as an integral part of the individual's conduct and
thought. If religious belief systems no longer function as the
central interpretative schemes within which individuals
understand their lives, then religion will wither and die."' 76 On
this view, "if religion is excluded from a significant portion of the
individual's life, its continuing relevance will be threatened."' 7 7
170. See generally IMMANUEL KANT, CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON (Norman K.
Smith, trans., Random House, Inc. 1958) (1781).
171. FRIEDRICH SCHLEIERMACHER, THE CHRISTIAN FAITH, 16-17 (H. R.
Mackintosh & J.S. Stewart eds., T&T Clark Ltd. 1999) (1830).
172. Brady, supra note 168, at 485.
173. See, e.g., GEORGE A. LINDBECK, THE NATURE OF DOCTRINE: RELIGION
AND THEOLOGY IN A POSTLIBERAL AGE, 33-41 (1984).
174. See, e.g., KATHRYN TANNER, THEORIES OF CULTURE: A NEW AGENDA FOR
THEOLOGY 152 (1997).
175. Brady, supra note 168, at 485.
176. Id. at 498.
177. Id. at 499. See Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 638 (1991) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting). ("Church and state would not be such a difficult subject if
religion were, as the Court apparently thinks it to be, some purely personal
avocation that can be indulged entirely in secret, like pornography, in the
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Not all theological post liberals believe that this requires a
more significant place for religion in the public square or those
portions of communal life associated with government. Most
famously, Stanley Hauerwas has argued that the church's distinct
nature can be preserved only by a certain separation from society
at large. 178 But for others, faith cannot be excluded from those
areas of life upon which the government increasingly wishes to
pronounce and instruct them. If faith is formed in community and
influenced by the secular world, then its systematic exclusion from
significant aspects of life will affect it.
Such exclusion is not neutral. As one separationist
commentator has noted, "the main battle today is not between
Catholicism and Protestantism, but between religion and cultural
secularism." 179 It is not between differing religious perspectives
but between religious and secular world views. If this is indeed a
challenge to communities of faith, then a naked public square is
anything but even-handed.
D. Secular Messages On Matters of Religious Import Violate the
Principle of Nonendorsement.
If a public school goes to great lengths to exclude expressions
of religious sentiment from public occasions, particularly when
they would otherwise be natural for a majority of students, it does
more than protect the sensibilities of minorities. It also teaches
those students that religion is not a public value, but something
most appropriately held - and discussed - in private. Similar
messages are sent when even historic expressions of religiosity are
ordered removed from the public squarei8 0 or providers of social
services are required to eliminate or temper their religious
perspectives.' 81
privacy of one's room. For most believers it is not that, and never has been.").
178. STANLEY HAUERWAS, A COMMUNITY OF CHARACTER: TOWARD A
CONSTRUCTIVE CHRISTIAN SOCIAL ETHIC 86 (1981).
179. Gey, supra note 29, at 1017.
180. McCreary County, Ky. v. ACLU of Ky., 125 S. Ct. 2722, 2739 (2005)
(Ten Commandments); Van Orden v. Perry, 125 S. Ct. 2854, 2858 (2005) (Ten
Commandments); Newdow v. Cong. of the United States, 383 F. Supp. 2d
1229, 1231 (E.D. Cal. 2005) (Pledge of Allegiance).
181. See, e.g., DeStefano v. Emgcy. Hous. Group, Inc., 247 F.3d 397, 408
(2d Cir. 2001) (arguing that Alcoholics Anonymous constitutes religion in
which publicly funded staff should not participate); Am. United for Sep. of
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Recall the ambitious nature of our Establishment Clause
jurisprudence. If we are to recoil at exposure to a brief
nondenominational prayer, how can we remain unconcerned about
what seems to be a much more significant intrusion on the
conscience of dissenters? How can we conclude that a government
that tells a citizen that her religious views are wrong or irrelevant
does not "harm" her in the same way that it harms her atheist
neighbor by confronting him with the endorsement of theism. 18 2
As Michael McConnell has written:
If the public school day and all its teaching are strictly
secular, the child is likely to learn the lesson that religion
is irrelevant to the significant things of this world, or at
least the spiritual realm is radically separate and distinct
from the temporal. However unintended, these are
lessons about religion. They are not "neutral." Studious
silence on a subject that parents may say touches all of
life is an eloquent refutation.'8 3
This is so whether or not public communication directly
addresses religion. Consider two hypothetical students. Dick is
an atheist. He may be exposed to such things as voluntary prayer
or a sticker on his textbook that identifies random evolution as a
theory and informs him that some people argue in favor of an
alternative theory called intelligent design. He is not coerced to
Church and State v. Prison Fellowship Min., 432 F. Supp. 2d 862, 865 (S.D.
Iowa 2006) (challenging a faith based prison ministry); Lown v. Salvation
Army, Inc., 393 F. Supp. 2d 223, 226 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (challenging
government funding of social services provided by Salvation Army); Teen
Ranch v. Udow, 389 F. Supp. 2d 827, 842 (W.D. Mich. 2005) (upholding
exclusion of state funds for program in which faith was incorporated into
residential treatment for juveniles).
182. See, e.g., Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 584 (1987) (noting
"[fl]amilies entrust public schools with the education of their children, but
condition their trust on the understanding that the classroom will not
purposely be used to advance religious beliefs that may conflict with the
private beliefs of the student and his or her family"). It is difficult to see how,
if a family who is harmed by having their child exposed to "Creation Science"
as an alternative to evolution, their evangelical neighbors are not harmed by
having their child told that she must reject what she regards to be the
scriptural account of the origin of life. If there is a principle that justifies
treating the two families differently, it is not "nonendorsement" or neutrality.
183. Michael W. McConnell, Neutrality Under the Religion Clauses, 81
Nw. U. L. REV. 146, 162 (1986).
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believe or proclaim anything. He is not told that his ideas are
wrong or untrue. He may feel left out. He may feel pressure to go
along and affirm what many of his classmates affirm.
Jane is an evangelical Christian. She believes that God
created the world and all living things in it, but is taught that life
arose as a result of random chemical processes. She believes that
pre-marital sex and homosexuality are sins, prohibited by God.
She is taught that gays and lesbians are exercising their
individual rights and are to be, if not celebrated, accepted. She is
taught that the decision to engage in premarital sex is hers alone
and, while (perhaps) inadvisable, is a decision that can be made on
the basis of considerations other than her religion, each of which
she is invited to explore. She is consistently reminded that she is
different. She feels strong pressure to conform.
The harm, if that is what it is, suffered by Dick and Jane is
similar. Both may feel excluded on the basis of their religious
views. Both are reminded that a majority of their classmates -
and the school which each attends - embrace a different set of
beliefs. Both are subject to school and peer pressure to alter their
own beliefs. But it is a generally accepted view that only Dick has
an Establishment Clause remedy. 184
If it is an establishment to require students to sit respectfully
at a graduation that they need not attend while someone who is
not a state employee briefly recites a prayer to a God in which
they do not believe, it is not immediately apparent why it is any
less an Establishment Clause concern to require students to listen
to a state employee teach - and require them, in some sense, to
affirm - a view of the origins of life' 8 5 or a way to approach critical
184. Courts have repeatedly held that parents have no right to object to
the provision of secular information that is inconsistent with their religious
beliefs. See, e.g., Fields v. Palmdale Sch. Dist., 427 F.3d 1197, 1200 (9th Cir.
2005) (challenging school survey containing sexual matter); Leebaert v.
Harrington, 332 F.3d 134, 135 (2d Cir. 2003) (objecting to mandatory health
education course); Parents United for Better Schools, Inc. v. Sch. Dist. of
Philadelphia Bd. of Educ., 148 F.3d 260, 262 (3d Cir. 1998); Brown v. Hot,
Sexy & Safer Prods., Inc., 68 F.3d 525, 529 (1st Cir. 1995) (objecting to
attendance at AIDS awareness assembly).
185. L. Scott Smith, On Teaching Neo-Darwinism in Public Schools:
Avoiding the Pall of Orthodoxy and the Threat of Establishment, 11 ROGER
WILLIAMS U. L. REV., 143, 148-49 (2005) ("[E]volution, interpreted as a
algorithmic expansion of life following its fortuitous appearance, violates the
Establishment Clause whenever taught as "factual" or orthodox doctrine in
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moral questions that is contrary to their religious beliefs.
E. Endorsement of Secularism Implicates Establishment Clause
Values
1. Protection of Minorities
As noted by Justice O'Connor, those who dissent from the
established view may come to see themselves as outsiders. 186 The
government should refrain from taking sides 187 and should, as
Professor Chemerinsky has put it, act in a way that "allows all in
society, of every religion and of no religion, to feel that the
government is theirs."'88  There is a notion that one's religious
beliefs are so fundamental to a person's existence so as to be akin
to a status; something that ought to be free of official disapproval
and not be the basis upon which official decisions about her are
made. If a student who is exposed to the word "God" in the Pledge
of Allegiance or to a nondenominational prayer or a passer-by who
happens upon a creche unaccompanied by the appropriate secular
or multi-cultural symbols is made to feel like a political outsider,
on what basis can we say that a student who is told, at least
implicitly, that her most deeply held beliefs about the manner in
which she is to live her life are not pertinent to life's biggest
questions is not also made to feel excluded? The extant evidence
suggests that she is. If the purpose of our Establishment Clause
jurisprudence is to assure citizens that the government is "their
own," quite a few people are not getting the message.
2. Promotion of Common Discourse and Unity
If the point of the non-establishment principle is to reduce
divisiveness around religious issues, there is little evidence that
this purpose has been served. It is far from obvious that religious
issues are uniquely divisive. Although it is common for scholars to
assert, without evidence, that this is so for Establishment Clause
public schools ... .
186. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 688 (1984) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring).
187. McCreary County, Ky. v. ACLU of Ky., 125 S. Ct. 2722, 2742 (2005)
(emphasizing neutrality as an interpretive guide).
188. See Chemerinsky, supra note 9, at 227.
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purposes, the same scholars will often argue that the nature of
strongly held non-religious views require the same protection that
the Constitution affords religious beliefs under the free exercise
clause.18 9 In a nation in which it is not uncommon for persons to
argue that they no longer wish to live in a nation that has voted
for a political party other than their own, 190 secular differences
can be just as charged as religious ones.
In any event, it is unlikely that religious differences can be
made to go away by siding with a secularist perspective. While
one can imagine intense public debate over invocations at the
opening of the school day, it is not necessary to imagine the
controversies that do exist over such matters as sex education,
diversity and the manner in which history should be taught.
Religious folks are not going gently into the good night. The
189. For example, Professor Laycock notes the peculiar sensitivity of
persons to suggestions that the government disapproves of their religious
beliefs or approves those of others in advancing the notion of substantive
neutrality. Douglas Laycock, Religious Liberty as Liberty, 7 J. CONTEMP.
LEGAL ISSUES 313, 320 (1996). However, in the free exercise context, he
argues that the law should protect nontheistic conscientious objections on the
same basis as theistic ones. Id. at 331. In other words, nontheistic principles
may be just as strongly held and equally integral to a person's identity. "Put
another way, if the Establishment Clause really was meant to protect
dissenters from being implicated in state action which violated deeply held
religious principles, then what warrant have we for refusing to extend this
principle beyond the bounds of religion, to nonreligious principles and
nonreligious actions?" Noah Feldman, The Intellectual Origins of the
Establishment Clause, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 346, 425 (2002). Professor Feldman
notes: "There are humanists and atheists, socialists and capitalists,
Aristotelians, Freudians, Darwiniens, Derrideans, Foucauldians and
Randians who mold nonreligious principles into the foundational bases of
their deeply-held views." Noah Feldman, From Liberty to Equality: The
Transformation of the Establishment Clause, 90 CAL. L. REV. 673, 717 (2002).
Professor Feldman, of course, is not an advocate of the endorsement test.
NOAH FELDMAN, DIVIDED BY GOD: AMERICA'S CHURCH-STATE PROBLEM - AND
WHAT WE SHOULD Do ABOUT IT 204-05 (2005).
190. Although perhaps not so charged as to actually leave. Although
celebrities as diverse as Pearl Jam frontman Eddie Vedder, Alec Baldwin,
Pierre Salinger and Barbara Streisand all said they would go, apparently
none have. See snopes.com, http://www.snopes.com/inboxer/outrage/leave.
htm (last visited Oct. 17, 2006). Canadian immigration officials did report a
surge in interest from the U.S. following President Bush's reelection.
Whitney Boggs, President Bush's Re-election Encourages Americans to Move
to Canada, Well ... Not Exactly, THE HILLTOP, Nov. 19, 2004, http://
www.thehilltoponline.com/home/archives/ (click on Nov. 19, 2004 -edition,
then select article under Nation & World heading).
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exclusion of religion from the public square has itself become
extraordinarily divisive. 191
3. Protection of Religious Liberty
Government sponsorship of religion may threaten to subject
religious liberty to secular control and sap its vitality. This view,
most widely associated with Roger Williams, holds that "worldly
corruptions . . . might consume the churches if sturdy fences
against the wilderness were not maintained."'192 But certainly the
sponsorship of secularism can do the same thing. Indeed,
separationist scholars defend their view by arguing that it will do
precisely that.19 3 In their view, inculcation of what they see as
"rationalist" and "inclusive" values is to be applauded,
notwithstanding (and perhaps because of) its adverse impact on at
least some religious perspectives. That it does so without
expressly mentioning God or theistic principles does not make it
any more "neutral."
If the point of non-establishment is to ensure that government
is substantively neutral, i.e., does as little as possible to affect the
religious choices of citizens, 194 this hardly seems served by the
imposition of a thorough going secularism in public spaces. If
public schools routinely teach that life's most significant questions
can - and, by implication, ought to - be answered without regard
to one's religious belief, isn't the risk of influencing those beliefs
exponentially higher than when it offers a voluntary non-
191. Erwin Chemerinsky, Why Justice Breyer Was Wrong in Van Orden v.
Perry, 14 WM. & MARY BILL OF RTS. J. 1, 3 (2005) (arguing that divisiveness
makes no sense as a principle because "[a]ny enforcement of the
Establishment Clause is inherently divisive"). But see Chemerinsky, supra
note 9, at 227 (arguing that nonestablishment should allow "all in society...
to feel that the government is theirs").
192. LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1158 (2d ed.
1988) (citing MARK D. HOWE, THE GARDEN AND THE WILDERNESS: RELIGION AND
GOVERNMENT IN AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY 6 (1965); PERRY MILLER,
ROGER WILLIAMS, HIS CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE AMERICAN TRADITION 89, 98
(1953)).
193. Macedo, supra note 17, at 422; Steven G. Gey, Why Is Religion
Special: Reconsidering the Accommodation of Religion Under the Religion
Clauses of the First Amendment, 52 U. PITT. L. REV. 75, 185-86 (1990)
(reasoning that a purpose of the Establishment Clause is to protect the state
from religion).
194. Laycock, supra note 66, at 1001-02.
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denominational prayer?
The notion that removing religious concerns from public
discourse will have an impact on the public is hardly new.
Jefferson famously saw a nation in which everyone would become
a "Unitarian" which, in his view, was a tolerant form of
Christianity making few distinct demands on its adherents. 195
Justice Frankfurter saw public schools in particular as inculcating
a common public ethos or "religion" of democracy, serving "as a
symbol of our secular unity."'196 When it comes to God, the
assumption of His absence may be as critical as the advocacy of
His presence. If the battle is between faith and secularism, then
pretending that the silence on religion is neutral has the effect of
licensing "one side of the debate to fight freestyle, while requiring
the other to follow Marquis of Queensbury rules."197 As Professor
Feldman points out, the secularist project has never emphasized
negative propositions about God, preferring instead to treat it as
irrelevant. 198
F. The Courts Have Not Acknowledged This Failure
Nevertheless, courts have generally rejected arguments that
public secularism either "establish" irreligion or interfere with
free exercise. The classic case is Mozert v. Hawkins County Board
of Education.199 In Mozert, plaintiffs argued that certain required
readings in the Hawkins County, Tennessee school district were
offensive to and contradictory of their religious beliefs and, for
that reason, a violation of their free exercise rights.200 The Court
of Appeals found no free exercise violation because the students
were required neither to affirm nor to deny any particular point of
view.20 1 In the court's view, "[w]hat [was] ... absent... [was] the
critical element of compulsion to affirm or deny a religious belief
195. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Dr. Benjamin Waterhouse (June 26,
1822), in 12 WORKS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 243 (Paul L. Ford ed., 1905).
196. McCullom v. Bd. of Educ. of Sch. Dist. No. 71, 333 U.S. 203, 217
(1948) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
197. R.A.V. v. St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 392 (1992).
198. FELDMAN, supra note 189, at 113, 129.
199. 827 F.2d 1058(6th Cir. 1987).
200. The Mozert plaintiffs chose not to advance an Establishment Clause
claim. They sought to be exempted from the offending curriculum, not to
change it. Id. at 1069.
201. Id. at 1076-77.
42 ROGER WILLIAMS UNiVERSITY LAWREVIEW [Vol. 12:1
or to engage or refrain from engaging in a practice forbidden or
required in the exercise of a plaintiffs religion. '202 Public schools
have the right, the court noted, to teach fundamental values
'essential to a democratic society"' including 'tolerance of
divergent political and religious views.' ' 203
This (and other aspects) of the Mozert holding have been
roundly criticized, not least of all for the court's failure to
recognize that exposure to, and the admonition to tolerate, certain
"divergent" views were precisely what the plaintiffs argued was
inconsistent with the exercise of their religion.204 Although the
Mozert plaintiffs did not assert an Establishment Clause claim,
the lack of symmetry is jarring. The absence of coercion has
never, or at least not recently, been a required element of an
Establishment Clause claim. In virtually no modern
Establishment Clause case, certainly not in Engel, Edwards,
Abington, Wallace, Lee, Santa Fe, or McCreary, was anyone
compelled to affirm anything.
The Eleventh Circuit, in Smith v. Board of School
Commissioners, considered and rejected a claim that pervasive
secularism violates the Establishment Clause. 205 In that case, the
trial court had held that certain textbooks used in elementary and
secondary schools in the state of Alabama violated the
Establishment Clause because they advanced the religion of
secular humanism and inhibited theistic religion.206 The Court of
Appeals disagreed. In its view, the texts conveyed a message of
"tolerance of diverse views, self-respect, maturity and logical
decision-making"20 7 and this was an "entirely appropriate secular
202. Id. at 1069.
203. Id. at 1068 (quoting Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675
(1986)).
204. Nomi Maya Stolzenberg, He Drew a Circle That Shut Me Out:
Assimilation, Indoctrination and the Paradox of Liberal Education, 106
HARV. L. REV. 582, 605-06 (1993) ("After all, requiring impressionable
children to exhibit adherence to beliefs they do not (yet) hold- is an effective
way of cultivating adherence to those beliefs.").
205. 827 F.2d 684, 695 (llth Cir. 1987).
206. Smith v. Bd. of Sch. Comm'rs, 655 F. Supp. 939, 988 (S.D. Ala. 1987).
For example, the district judge Brevard Hand found that home economics
textbooks promoted an "individualistic," "relativist," and utilitarian form of
moral decision-making. Id. at 986.
207. Smith v. Bd. of Sch. Comm'rs, 827 F.2d 684, 692 (11th Cir. 1987).
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effect. '208 The absence of a discussion of religion, it concluded, did
not convey a message of approval of secular humanism. 209 Other
cases considering allegations of an "establishment" of secularism
have generally reached similar conclusions. 210
G. Nonendorsement Cannot Be Saved
There are at least four ways in which one might attempt to
save nonendorsement. None work.
1. Embrace the Failure
One response, as we have seen, is to argue that the apparent
lack of neutrality between the endorsement of religion and
secularism is not a bad thing. God talk, on this view, is dangerous
for democracy and should be kept from the public square.
Professor Gey, for. example, borrowing from Rawls and Rorty,
argues that democracies require popular control of the
government, the tentative nature of all political decisions and
policy arguments that are susceptible to rational critique and
empirical analysis.211 Religious perspectives appeal to a higher
authority, claim that there are eternal truths, and are not shared
by absolutely everyone. 212 Consequently they run afoul of all
three "requirements." Professor Macedo argues that, the framers
of the Constitution were engaged in "soulcraft,'' 213 and that the
state should adopt policies "to encourage popular enlightenment,
the capacity for reflective and self critical deliberation, and broad
208. Id.
209. Id. at 693.
210. Cf. Morrison v. Bd. of Educ. of Boyd County, 419 F. Supp. 2d 937,
943-44 (E.D. Ky. 2006) (noting that students exposed to sensitivity training
alleged to inculcate positive view of homosexuality does not compel students
to disavow their religious principles or endorse homosexuality). Most often,
establishment claims are avoided by characterizing a refusal to move from a
secular baseline as supported by an interest in avoiding the perception of
religious endorsement or in avoiding religious controversy. See, e.g., Wallace
v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 76 (O'Connor, J., concurring); Peck v. Baldwinsville
Cent. Sch. Dist., 426 F.3d 617 (2d Cir. 2005).
211. Gey, supra note 29, at 1023-24.
212. Id. Even if the majority share common religious presuppositions,
Professor Gey would believe this requirement unmet because the "majority"
is not "the collective." Id. at 1020.
213. Macedo, supra note 17, at 422.
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forms of social cooperation. ''2 14 That these policies will have
"nonneutral impacts on differing religious traditions" is not an
unfortunate by-product of this soulcraft, but its very purpose. 215
In the same vein, Professor Sullivan argues that a secular
public order ends the war of "all against all," ushering in social
peace that would presumably be impossible if religious folk were
permitted to get too pushy.2 16 Too much religion, as Professor Gey
would have it, risks the "unity of the graveyard. '2 17
Others have responded to this claim more fully than I can
here.218 It is not at all clear that religious claims are devoid of
reason 219 or any more dependent on "inaccessible" first order
principles than other forms of discourse. 220 The notion that all
truth claims in a democratic society are or ought to be
"contingent" is both normatively 221 and objectively 222 spurious.
214. Id. at 426.
215. Id. at 427. ("Not only is there no reason to try and correct for these
nonneutral effects on religious and cultural communities, we count on the
communities changing in ways that are supportive of liberal democracy.").
216. Sullivan, supra note 17, at 199-201.
217. Gey, supra note 29. Professor Gey invokes Justice Jackson's famous
metaphor to argue (although he would not put it this way) that the one
orthodoxy that may be prescribed is a rigorous public secularism. See, e.g.,
W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 641 (1943).
218. See, e.g., STOUT, supra note 10, at 75; STEPHEN CARTER, CULTURE OF
DISBELIEF (1992); Michael W. McConnell, Five Reasons to Reject the Claim
that Religious Arguments Should be Excluded From Democratic Deliberation,
1999 UTAH L. REV. 639 (1999).
219. See Steven D. Smith, Barnette's Big Blunder, 78 CHI. KENT L. REV.
625, 650 (2003) (observing that "Christians differ tremendously in which we
might call the epistemological and existential routes they take to arrive at a
'Christian' outlook."); see also Larry Alexander, Liberalism, Religion And The
Unity of Epistemology, 30 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 763, 770, 775, 789 (1993).
(believers often use reason to support theological positions). St. Thomas
Aquinas famously emphasized the accessibility of much of the natural law
through reason. 2 ST. THOMAS AQUINAS, "THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA," Part I of
Second Part, question 90, art 2, reprinted in 20 GREAT BOOKS OF THE WESTERN
WORLD 209 (Robert Maynard Hutchins ed., 1952).
220. See Alexander, supra note 219, at 780, 796; Michael W. McConnell,
The New Establishmentarianism, 75 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 453, 461 (2000) ("But
establishmentarianism has had a rebirth - ironically, in the very name of
pluralism, diversity and tolerance."). The gimlet-eyed Justice Oliver Wendell
Holmes conceded that even his thorough going legal positivism was corrupted
by irreducible principles that he referred to as "can't helps." ALBERT W.
ALSCHULER, A Century of Skepticism, in CHRISTIAN PERSPECTIVES ON LEGAL
THOUGHT, supra note 1, at 96.
221. It is not evident why a democracy should not be - and is not, in fact -
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Nor is it evident that they are any more intolerant of dissenters 223
or less prone to extremism. 224
In any event, as noted earlier, the Court has not accepted -
and has expressly repudiated - the notion that the religion clauses
establish a secular public order. 225
2. Denial of Failure
Some scholars have argued that the tension between
mandating secular government speech and establishing irreligion
is not as acute as popularly claimed. They point out that groups
with competing views of the role of religion in public life have
agreed on broad statements of what type of religious discourse is
permitted in public schools, including "objective" teaching about
religion and respect for private religious expression by students.
Religion in the Public Schools: a Joint Statement of Current Law,
a statement issued by a variety of interested groups, 226 requires
that references to religion be objective and that schools may teach
"values" as long as they are not taught as religious tenets. This
statement prompted Kathleen Brady to observe that, for many
religious groups, "the effort to retain religious references in
government settings has not only taken a back seat to private
based upon certain settled principles such as freedom of speech, equal
protection of the laws and the innate value of human life.
222. It is far from clear that first order principles such as tolerance,
respect for certain forms of diversity, and assumptions regarding matters
such as gender quality are open to "debate" in modern liberalism as the
firestorm over Lawrence Summers recent remarks regarding the distribution
of exceptional mathematical abilities between the genders demonstrates.
223. McConnell, supra note 218, at 453.
224. Douglas Laycock, Continuity and Change in the Threat to Religious
Liberty: The Reformation Era and the Late Twentieth Century, 80 MINN. L.
REV. 1047, 1094 (1996). ("The twentieth century has produced Hitler, Stalin,
Mao and Pol Pot and in our own country terrorist bombs on behalf of peace,
environmentalism, the right to bear arms, and liberation of Puerto Rico.").
225. See Part IV.F and accompanying notes.
226. This statement is available online at http://www.ed.gov/Speeches/04-
1995/prayer.html [hereinafter Joint Statement]. Although the statement was
joined by the Christian Legal Society, more typical signatories are
separationist groups such as People for the American Way and liberal
religious groups such as the Interfaith Alliance, National Council of
Churches, Presbyterian Church (USA), Unitarian Universalist Association of
Congregations and the United Church of Christ's Office for Church in
Society, as well as a number of minority religious groups who have
traditionally seen separationism as the best guarantee of their own liberty.
46 ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITY LAWREVIEW [Vol. 12:1
religious speech, but has almost disappeared. ' '227 As Professor
Brady noted, Christian conservatives have endeavored to
accurately state the law and, consequently, produced statements
approximating the joint statement. 228
But "conservatives" and "liberals" do not agree on what the
law is or should be. 229 Nor, within settled law, do they agree on
what speech is objective and what discussions of religion are
"sponsored" by the government, and whether proselytizing speech
must be prohibited.2 30
Given the continued frequency of litigation over religious
expression in public schools, any declaration of peace may be
premature. "Objective" teaching may not be, nor is not likely to
be, neutral 231 and the nature of education is such that the voice of
the state and those of its students are inherently unequal. The
school is not, nor does it try to be, an objective mediator of
competing ideas and methods. It takes positions, and the
positions it takes matter. The notion that values can be divorced
227. Kathleen A. Brady, The Push to Private Religious Expression: Are We
Missing Something, 70 FORDHAM L. REV. 1147, 1195-96 (2002). Professor
Brady attributes this, at least in part, to a recognition by conservative
religious groups that their views might not prevail if the state were to be
permitted broader leeway in endorsing religious views. Id. at 1156. Indeed
many such groups now advocate withdrawal from the public sphere. Id.
This, of course, suggests that nonendorsement, far from creating common
ground has prompted some religious people, not merely to feel like outsiders,
but to become refugees.
228. Id. at 1154. See generally Jay Alan Sekulow, James Henderson &
John Tuskey, Proposed Guidelines For Student Religious Speech and
Observance in Public Schools, 46 MERCER L. REV. 1017 (1995).
229. The Clinton Department of Education promulgated guidelines
regarding reference to religion in public education (available online at
http://www.ed.gov/speeches08-1995/religion.html), which were significantly
modified by President Bush's Secretary of Education Rod Paige (available
online at http://www.ed.gov/policy/gen/guid/religionandschoolindex.html).
The revised guidelines have been bitterly criticized by Americans United for
Separation of Church and State (available online at
http://www.au.org/she/docserver/public-school-guidance.pdP docID=186).
230. See supra note 227 and accompanying text.
231. See, e.g., Citizens for a Responsible Curriculum v. Montgomery Pub.
Sch., No. Civ. A. AW-05-1194, 2005 WL 1075634, at 11 (D. Md. 2005)
(discussing religious attitudes toward homosexuality found to be skewed
against, and dismissive of, more conservative faith traditions); Hansen v.
Ann Arbor Pub. Sch., 293 F. Supp. 2d 780, 782-83 (E.D. Mich. 2003) (school
sponsored panel discussion on religion and homosexuality excluded views
critical of homosexuality).
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from their religious foundations 232 without damage to those
foundations is not obvious.
Just as significantly, much of the struggle over religious
expression in schools is over whether to characterize particular
expression as private or attributable to the government. 233 The
Joint Statement itself recognizes that the current case law may
require restrictions on even private religious speech to a "captive
audience."234
Where government maintains an open forum, it cannot
engage in view point, as opposed to content, discrimination. 235
This may not apply, however, to school-sponsored speech, i.e.,
private speech that a school "affirmatively . . . promotes" as
opposed to that it merely tolerates. 236 Lower courts, particularly
in the context of public schools, have not been reluctant to uphold
the exclusion of private religious speech from government fora
where the government has exercised substantial or plenary
control over the context of speech permitted in those fora,237
232. See, e.g., Alan E. Garfield, A Positive Rights Interpretation of the
Establishment Clause, 76 TEMP. L. REV. 281, 292 (2003) ("The state must
simply ensure that its values are grounded not in religious beliefs [even if
that might explain their origin] but in the secular values of equality and
liberty.").
233. Laycock, supra note 101, at 220; Steven W. Fitschen, Religion in the
Public Schools After Santa Fe Independent School District v. Doe: Time For a
New Strategy, 9 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 433, 436, 439 (2001).
234. Joint Statement, supra note 226.
235. Ark. Educ. Television Comm'n. v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666, 677 (1998)
(quoting Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, 473 U.S. 788, 800
(1985)); Int'l Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 678
(1992).
236. Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 270-71 (1988).
"[E]ducators do not offend the First Amendment by exercising editorial
control over school-sponsored student speech so long as their actions are
reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical concerns." Id. at 273.
237. See, e.g., Peck v. Baldwinsville Cent. Sch. Dist., 426 F.3d 617 (2d Cir.
2005); Bannon v. Sch. Dist. of Palm Beach County, 387 F.3d 1208 (11th Cir.
2004) (concluding that school's elimination of religious content in a student
painted mural was content, and not viewpoint discrimination, because it did
not discuss secular topics from a religious perspective and because the school
had a legitimate pedagogical concern in excluding religious expression to
avoid "disruption"); Lassonde v. Pleasanton Unified Sch. Dist., 320 F.3d 979
(9th Cir. 2003) (upholding exclusion of religious expression from graduation
speech because school exercises "plenary" control over commencement
remarks); Fleming v. Jefferson County Sch. Dist. R-1, 298 F.3d 918, 925, 931-
32 (10th Cir. 2002) (holding that school could refuse to permit religious
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particularly in the realm of public education.
This threatens to give the game away. If private religious
speech violates the Establishment Clause, whenever government
encourages an opportunity to express it,238 permits it in a context
in which it has reserved the right to censor messages, 239 or
arranges for its provision by a private party,240 then private
religious speech remains a step-child in the public square.
Perhaps, recognizing this dilemma, some scholars have
suggested permitting, and have advocated the utility of, expanded
tolerance for private religious speech in public settings. Professor
Brady has argued that courts permit additional space for certain
"grey area" speech that might be attributed to the state.241 She
has argued that, while schools themselves should refrain from
religious speech, they ought to be permitted to tolerate, and even
to encourage, private religious speech in contexts that, under
current law, might be perceived as "attributable to the
government" and, therefore, unconstitutional.242  Others have
called for greater leeway in permitting the schools to "objectively"
discuss religion perspectives. 243
Of course, to eliminate the tension, such discussions would
have to be mandated, not required. If a secularist bias violates
the Establishment Clause, it is hardly a sufficient response to
"permit" the state to level the playing field.24 Under current
messages in Columbine memorial because "avoiding religious controversy" is
a legitimate pedagogical concern); Ashby v. Isle of Wight County Sch. Bd.,
354 F. Supp. 2d 616 (E.D. Va. 2004) (upholding prohibition of
nondenominational religious song that student chose to sing at graduation
ceremony because school does not have "hands off' policy toward student
expression at commencement); Phillips v. Oxford Separate Mun. Sch. Dist.,
314 F. Supp. 2d 643 (N.D. Miss. 2003) (holding that school may censor
religious-themed message in student election campaign poster).
238. See Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 40 n.2 (1985); Karen B. v. Treen,
653 F.2d 987, 999 (5th Cir. 1981), affd mem, 455 U.S. 913 (1982).
239. Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 590 US. 290, 305-06 (2000).
240. Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 581, 587-88 (1992).
241. See Brady, supra note 227, at 1152.
242. Id. at 1090.
243. Jay D. Wexler, Preparing For the Clothed Public Square: Teaching
About Religion, Civic Education and the Constitution, 43 WM. & MARY L. REV.
1159, 1166 (2002).
244. Cf. Doe v. Human, 725 F. Supp. 1503, 1508 n.2 (W.D. Ark. 1989)
(rejecting argument that bible classes should be permitted as a matter of
balance because "even if defendants have established one religion (secular
humanism) such conduct does not allow them to establish a second
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notions of endorsement and of the need to ensure that no one is
made to feel uncomfortable, we ordinarily do not regard the fact
that students may contradict or supplement state indoctrination
to vitiate Establishment Clause concerns. 245
3. Dismissal of the Failure
Another response is dismissal. If religious people feel like
political outsiders, they shouldn't. Returning to Justice
O'Connor's formulation of the endorsement test, the argument is
that a reasonable observer, familiar with the history and
background of the First Amendment, would understand that the
government is not endorsing secularism because, in effect, it has
no choice. It must avoid religious perspectives and, therefore, no
hostility toward religion or advocacy of secular approaches to life,
should be read into its, well, secularism. A secular public sphere
in this view is simply the Constitution's settlement of "the war of
all against all" and religious folks need take no offense at their
exclusion. 246 A reasonably informed observer would understand
that we just do not talk about religion in public places.
But if one simply decides what actual people should or should
not understand, as opposed to what they do understand,247 one
has merely proposed a contentless test that is unrelated to the
harm that it is designed to avoid. It makes sense to impose a
secularist view of the Establishment Clause on our objective
observer, only if the Establishment Clause in fact mandates a
secular public order. Thus the stronger version of this response
reduces into the view of those for whom state promoted secularism
(Christianity); aff'd without opinion, Doe v. Human, 925 F.2d 857 (5th Cir.
1990), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 922 (1991).
245. See, e.g., Gey, supra note 8, at 1891 (arguing that cases like Lee and
Santa Fe prohibit "subtle psychological coercion to involuntarily endure the
religious activities of others").
246. Sullivan, supra note 17, at 197.
247. As Justice Thomas has observed, a "reasonable observer" test may
satisfy a few real people:
For the nonadherent, who may well be more sensitive than the hypothetical
"reasonable observer," or who may not know all the facts, this test fails to
capture completely the honest and deeply felt offense he takes from the
government conduct. For the adherent, this analysis' takes no account of the
message sent by removal of the sign or display, which may well appear to him
to be an act hostile to his religious faith.
Van Orden v. Perry, 125 S. Ct. 2854, 2867 (2005) (concurring opinion).
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is not the problem but the solution. Many actual observers,
reasonable or otherwise, do regard the exclusion of religious
perspectives from schools and public services to evince a hostility
toward religion and to be tantamount to an establishment of
secularism. Whether properly informed or not, they do feel like
political outsiders.
A variation of this approach, advanced by some
commentators, is to argue that establishment of "non-religion"
would require the express advocacy of an agnostic or atheistic
position. As long, to quote one commentator, as the schools have
not taught "that there is no God," the fact that they have taught
values and methods of reaching them incompatible with some
students' religious view is unproblematic. 248 Several lower courts,
faced with an argument that the exclusion of expressions of faith
from public life constitutes an establishment of secularism, have
also emphasized the need for some active advocacy, as opposed to
the mere assumption, of irreligion.
Consistent with this view, plaintiffs challenging government
imposition of secularist perspectives or viewpoints that are
contradictory of their religious viewpoints have been most
successful when officials have slipped and let in a little religious
discourse. In Hansen v. Ann Arbor Public Schools, 249 plaintiffs
succeeded on Establishment grounds, again, at least in part,
because school officials had invited clergy in to discuss the
compatibility of homosexuality with religious faith, while not
permitting the expression of an opposing view. In Citizens for a
Responsible Curriculum v. Montgomery Public Schools,250 the use
248. Laycock, supra note 224, at 1082.
249. 293 F. Supp. 2d 780 (E.D. Mich. 2003).
250. No. Civ.A. AW-05-1194, 2005 WL 1075634 (D. Md. May 5, 2005). In
Harper v. Poway Unified School District, in response to a school sponsored
"Day of Silence" promoting tolerance for gays and lesbians, a student wore a
homemade T-shirt expressing his disapproval of homosexuality on religious
grounds. 345 F. Supp. 2d 1096 (S.D. Cal. 2004). Although the district court
denied his motion for a preliminary injunction, he was found to have stated
Establishment and Free Exercise claims (in addition to a free speech claim)
at least in part because school officials had told him to "leave his faith in his
car" and that Christianity was based on "love, not hate" and, therefore, he
should not offend others. Id. at 1114. On appeal, however, a divided panel of
the Ninth Circuit rejected his religion clause claims. Harper v. Poway
Unified Sch. Dist., 455 F.3d 1052 (9th Cir. 2006), petition for rehearing en
banc denied, 2006 WL 2103580 (9th Cir. July 31, 2006).
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of instructional materials advocating tolerance for gays and
lesbians was enjoined on Establishment Clause grounds because
the materials included what the court found to be a one-sided
discussion of religious perspectives on the issue.251
While these outcomes make perfect sense, it is far from clear
that the plaintiffs in any of these cases would have felt less
offended or excluded or experienced more pressure to conform or
that the issue would have been less divisive had school officials
excluded or criticized their points of view on purely secular
grounds. 252
In any event, the distinction between active advocacy and the
communication of a world view that marginalizes religious
concerns seems chimerical. As Stephen Carter has observed,
there is a logical sense in which the refusal to treat an idea as
relevant is to treat it as false. 253  To argue that there is a
meaningful distinction between advocacy of a set of ideas that are
completely inconsistent with a proposition and express denial of
the proposition is to insult the intelligence of the hearer. 254
The Court has, from time to time, understood this. While
Abington spoke of affirmative opposition or hostility, 255 the Court's
later pronouncements have recognized that the exclusion of
religious perspectives may send the forbidden message of
exclusion to religious citizens. For example, in Good News
Club,256 the Court recognized that exclusion of religious programs
from after school use of a school building is just as likely to create
the appearance of hostility toward religion as inclusion of such
programs is likely to create the perception of endorsement of
religion. In Rosenberger,257 the majority, in rejecting an
251. Citizens for a Responsible Curriculum, 2005 WL 1075634 *9. In
general, the exclusion of religious expression in school sponsored fora has
been unconstitutional only where schools have exercised insufficient control
over the forum's content. See, e.g., Kiesinger v. Mexico Academy and Cent.
Sch., No. 5:00-CV-1356, 2006 WL 936143 (N.D.N.Y Mar. 31, 2006); Seidman
v. Paradise Valley Unified Sch. Dist., 327 F. Supp. 2d 1098 (D. Ariz. 2004);
Tong v. Chicago Park Dist., 316 F. Supp. 2d 645, 654-58 (N.D. Ill. 2004).
252. In such circumstances, plaintiffs might still have a free speech claim.
253. See generally CARTER, supra note 3.
254. Smith, supra note 219, at 647.
255. Sch. Dist. of Abington Twp., Pa. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 225
(1963).
256. Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98, 118 (2001).
257. Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819,
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Establishment Clause defense to the petitioners' free speech
claim, observed that denying government support to student
publications that are religious, while extending support to those
which are not, would risk fostering a pervasive bias or hostility to
religion, which would undermine the very neutrality that the
Establishment Clause requires.
Nor, as noted earlier, is a rule that turns on express, rather
than implicit advocacy consistent with the Court's treatment of
government endorsements of religion. These have been prohibited
without regard to whether there is a claim to exclusivity or the
express negation of some competing point of view.2 58
The difficulty is not finessed by reference to the well-known
rule that government is not barred from communicating a
particular message simply because it is consistent or inconsistent
with the tenets of a religion.259 The problem is not simply that
government has taken a position that happens to run afoul of a
tenet of someone's religion or is simply consistent with an
atheistic or agnostic world view. The problem is that government
has systematically, whether by constitutional fiat, fear of
litigation, or a secularist bent, ruled out religion as an approach to
whatever information is being imparted or service being provided,
effectively denying its relevance. The exclusion is neither
happenstance nor partial.
Secularism makes no claims other than the irrelevance or
absence of religious perspectives. 26 0 To communicate to believers
that their God is unnecessary in forming beliefs about the origins
845-46 (1995).
258. In Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578 (1987), for example, the Court
held that a statute requiring the teaching of "creation science" along with
evolution constituted the endorsement of religion notwithstanding the
absence of express affirmation of any particular religious point of view. The
invocation held unconstitutional in Lee involved nothing more than the
speaker's invocation of monotheistic God. McCreary, although influenced by
the Court's perception of the country's "true" intent, expressly involved a
religious expression included in a display exhibiting secular perspectives as
well.
259. See, e.g., Harris v. McCrae, 448 U.S. 297, 318-20 (1980); but see
Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578 (1987) (teaching of creation science is an
establishment because "religiously motivated").
260. William T. Cavanaugh, The City: Beyond Secular Parodies, in
RADIcAL ORTHODOXY: A NEW THEOLOGY (John Milbank, Catherine Pickstock
& Graham Ward eds., 1999) ("[Secularism] ... is the substitution of one
mythos of salvation for another.").
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of life, when to have sex or how to make moral decisions is
tantamount to saying that their God does not, or might as well
not, exist.261
Professor Shiffrin argues that while this may be true as a
matter of "logical entailment," it is not as a matter of social
meaning. 262 It is difficult to see, however, why the assignment of
one social meaning is to be preferred over another. Shiffrin
argues that there is a difference between saying "I am a Catholic"
and establishing Catholicism as the state religion. 263 There may
well be such a distinction (in fact, as I explain later, I believe that
there almost certainly is), but when the government is the
speaker, it is a distinction the Court has generally chosen to
ignore. If we are to ignore it in the context of religious
expressions, then we must also ignore it with respect to secular
expressions excluding or contradicting religious points of view.
Finally, as we have seen, the idea that there is a readily
negotiated distinction between beliefs about God and beliefs about
how to live one's life and regard public issues is itself not neutral
in its view of religion, seeing faith as something which is
essentially private and unconnected with the believer's public
persona. That is not religiously neutral.
4. Surrender to the Failure
Finally, there is a strong temptation to surrender. The
strongest argument against the notion that the exclusion of
religious perspectives establishes secularism may be that
recognition of the problem creates enormous practical
difficulties.264 It would be unlikely that a school could present
each and every religious perspective on a question or that, even if
it could, that doing so would not seriously undermine the
pedagogical process. 2 65 Nor does it seem practical in this day and
age, if it ever was, to say that schools may simply not discuss
261. Steven H. Shiffrin, Liberalism and the Establishment Clause, 78 CHI.-
KENT L. REV. 717, 726 (2003).
262. Id.
263. Id.
264. See, e.g., Steven H. Shiffrin, The Pluralistic Foundations of the
Religion Clauses, 90 CORNELL L. REV. 9, 78 (2004) (government could not
function if it could not vitiate religious views).
265. Id.
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those topics on which religious views are pertinent. Apart from
the problem of defining those topics in a way which does not
include - for at least some persons somewhere - everything, it
seems that any possible definition will remove a great deal from
public school curriculums and impair a great many governmental
services.
But to suggest that a problem creates practical difficulties
does not mean it is not a problem. In a sense, Establishment
Clause jurisprudence may be hoisted on its own petard. The
Court has traditionally defined establishment in a way which does
not require coercion or an endorsement of anything like a
comprehensive sectarian viewpoint. It can be merely the
perception of endorsement and what is endorsed need not be very
specific, comprehensive or controversial. When establishment
happens so simply, it may be difficult for public institutions not to
endorse secularism as they seek to avoid the establishment of
religion.
Recognizing this, Professor Shiffrin suggests "a constitutional
obligation to include [religious] materials in the curriculum. 266
But, sensing the impossibility of maintaining neutrality, he
believes that such an obligation would be "rightly judicially
unenforceable. '267 It is not clear why the sensibilities of the
secular should be so enforceable while those of the religious may
not, other than the inability to do both without abandoning the
nonendorsement project altogether. It is to that abandonment
that we now turn.
VII. TOWARD A MORE MODEST ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE
It may be that the courts will continue to ignore the problem.
Although the Supreme Court has not given much attention to the
issue, it has never found an establishment of irreligion. In Engel
v. Vitale, for example, the Court made clear that removing prayer
from public schools in and of itself did not establish secularism.2 68
In Abington, the Court similarly found that the exclusion of
mandatory bible reading did not establish irreligion. 269 In more
266. Id.
267. Id.
268. Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 425 (1962).
269. Sch. Dist. of Abington Twp., Pa. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 225
(1963).
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recent cases, such as Lee and Santa Fe, the Court seemed
unconcerned about the implications of a selective censorship of
student discourse at graduation.270
These cases did not present the precise issue considered here.
Removal of worship or of a religious affirmation is arguably
distinct from expressing points of view or offering services to
which religious perspectives are pertinent but excluded.
Moreover, as noted earlier, in cases like Zelman, Rosenberger, and
Good News Club, the Court has more recently observed that
exclusion of religion from certain fora may raise Establishment
Clause concerns. But, in general, courts have either not
rigorously analyzed the issue or maintained that the exclusion of
something is not its negation. They have failed to see that the
norm of anti-Establishment can be violated just as readily by
secularism as by public religiosity. And, as we have seen, lower
courts have been generally, if not universally, unsympathetic.
However, if the government is not to take sides, a government
that promotes only secular perspectives is not even-handed. If
citizens are not to be made to feel like outsiders on the basis of
religion, then telling them that their core beliefs are wrong or
irrelevant cannot be saved by the expedient of not saying that the
God that is being ignored does not exist.
The failure to apply the idea of nonendorsement across the
board is not simply an inevitable doctrinal inconsistency, or a
mere concession to practicality, but is itself a departure from
neutrality that tilts the playing field in an area of life that the
Framers thought deserved an extraordinary degree of liberty. If
we wish to be rigorously neutral on religious questions, then we
need to be rigorously neutral. To merely pretend to do so because
true neutrality sets the bar too high distorts public discourse in
ways that are not often acknowledged. This is, in many respects,
more insidious than explicit bias. "The danger facing those who
disagree with the state's view," as one scholar has noted, "most
often, is not from any plausible fear of classic censorship - i.e.,
overt punishment for offering views repugnant to state authorities
- but, rather, from being drowned out of the marketplace by the
270. Santa Fe Ind. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 308 (2000); Lee v.
Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992).
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often superior resources of the state. ''271
A. The Demise of Nonendorsement
It is unclear whether the endorsement test will exert as much
influence as it has in the past following the retirement of Justice
O'Connor. While all of the remaining Justices have, at one time or
another, joined in opinions that purport to apply the test, its
application seems to have been driven by Justice O'Connor's
status as a likely swing vote.2 72 For example, Justices Breyer,
Souter, Stevens and Ginsburg, while sometimes using
endorsement language, generally set the endorsements bar so low
that virtually any government support for religion constitutes
establishment.
It is, of course, possible that the Court may swing back toward
a separationist view. Justices Stevens, Ginsburg, Souter and,
notwithstanding his concurrence in Van Orden, Breyer, are
largely separationist and may garner majorities either by
attracting the vote of Justice Kennedy or of Chief Justice John
Roberts or Justice Alito if either turn out to adopt something
approximating a separationist view.
This seems unlikely. Justice Kennedy, as noted below, has a
track record that, while not free of the doctrinal inconsistency
noted here, is not separationist. While the new Chief Justice does
not have an extensive record on church and state issues, it seems
unlikely that he will turn out to be markedly more separationist
than Chief Justice Rehnquist. Samuel Alito, seems just as, if not
more, favorably disposed to accommodation than the jurist he
would replace. 273 A thoroughgoing separationism would appear to
be in sight, but out of reach.
In the other corner, at the end of the past term there
appeared to be at least three justices willing to abandon or
271. SANFORD LEVINSON, WRITTEN IN STONE: PUBLIC MONUMENTS IN
CHANGING SOCIETIES 79-80 (1998).
272. Justice Kennedy has also been a swing vote in establishment clause
cases, but has not been a strong proponent of a rigorous "endorsement"
analysis.
273. Jay A. Sekulow & Francis A. Marion, The Supreme Court and The
Ten Commandments: Compounding The Establishment Clause Confusion, 14
WM. & MARY LAW REV. 33, 50 (2005). Although given that confirmation
politics are currently driven by a policy of "you can ask, but I won't tell,"
there is no way to be sure.
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substantially de-emphasize the test. As noted earlier, in
McCreary, Justices Thomas and Scalia and Chief Justice
Rehnquist argued for an Establishment Clause jurisprudence that
would call for substantial deference to non-coercive governmental
recognition, and even a limited form of endorsement, of
monotheistic religion. In Van Orden, concurrences by Justices
Scalia and Thomas called for non-preferentialist and coercion-
based views respectively.
If the new members of the Court do join Justices Scalia and
Thomas in adopting a more tolerant view of government discourse
regarding religion, Justice Kennedy will, at least for awhile, be the
most likely "swing vote." Although he voted with the majority in
Santa Fe and wrote the opinion of the Court in Lee, he has not
been a prominent supporter of the endorsement test.274 While he
has joined in opinions in which it has been adopted, 275 he has, at
other times, at least acknowledged the ultimate futility of the
inclusiveness which the endorsement test seeks to achieve.
Concurring in the judgment and dissenting in part from the
Court's majority opinion in Allegheny, Justice Kennedy wrote, that
when it comes to Christmas displays, "[j]udicial invalidation of
governments attempts to recognize the religious underpinnings of
the holiday would signal not neutrality but a pervasive intent to
insulate government from all things religious. ' 276 For Justice
Kennedy, treating "what is orthodox . . . [as] what is secular..."
raises Establishment Clause concerns just as the imposition of
religious orthodoxy.277  Writing in Lee, he observed that
''sometimes to endure social isolation and even anger may" be the
price of nonconformity and that "[t]o endure the speech of false
ideas or offensive content and then to counter it is part of learning
how to live in a pluralistic society .... ,,278 In short, he has been
skeptical of the notion that the state can present a public face that
is inoffensive to all.
But while Justice Kennedy has favored broader leeway for
274. Santa Fe Ind. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 308 (2000); Lee v.
Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992).
275. McCreary County, Ky. v. ACLU of Ky., 125 S. Ct. 2722, 2733 (2005).
276. County of Allegheny v. ACLU, Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, 492 U.S.
573, 663 (1989) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
277. Id. at 678.
278. Lee, 505 U.S. at 596, 597-98.
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governmental involvement with religion, emphasizing, at times,
coercion as the lynchpin of analysis of governmental religious
speech, 279 his view of coercion arguably elides into the right to be
free of exposure to religious views with which one disagrees. On
the ground this looks quite a bit like nonendorsement.
As noted earlier in Lee v. Weisman, for example, Justice
Kennedy observed that "by the time they are seniors, high school
students no doubt have been required to attend classes and
assemblies and to complete assignments exposing them to ideas
they find distasteful or absurd or all of these. 280 He concedes that
such students "may consider it an odd measure of justice to be
subjected during the course of their educations to ideas deemed
offensive and irreligious, but to be denied a brief, formal prayer
ceremony that the school offers in return. '281 Still, he concludes,
that to sit quietly while others pray is "too high an exaction to
withstand the test of the Establishment Clause. '282
Justice Kennedy has generally voted to uphold state
accommodation of religion in other contexts.283 It seems unlikely,
then, that he will provide a decisive vote to abandon the notion of
nonendorsement. 284
B. A Return to Nonestablishment
So while our Establishment Clause jurisprudence may be
momentarily in equipoise, Justice O'Connor's retirement may
bring us closer to a reexamination of nonendorsement. What
might such a new Establishment Clause jurisprudence look like?
It is a presupposition of those who advocate separationist, or
what are termed "neutrality" based approachments to the
Establishment Clause, that there is a need, at some level, to
279. Id. at 597.
280. Id. at 591.
281. Id.
282. Id. at 598.
283. See, e.g., Van Orden v. Perry, 125 S. Ct. 2854 (2005); McCreary
County, Ky. v. ACLU of Ky., 125 S. Ct. 2722 (2005).; Zelman v. Simmons-
Harris, 536 U.S. 638 (2002); Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S.
98 (2001); Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819
(1995); Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753 (1995);
County of Allegheny v. ACLU, Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, 492 U.S. 573
(1989).
284. Lee, 505 U.S. at 592.
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quarantine religion from the state. While they may differ on just
how extensive this quarantine must be and where it ought to
start, they share the idea that, at some point, serious religious
references and practices may not be expressed from fora or by
speakers too closely associated with the state. More significantly,
this proscription applies whether or not these references or
practices are coercive, proselytizing, or marked by claims of
exclusivity or of condemnation of nonadherents. None of this is
self evidently true.
1. "No establishment" means.., no establishment
Justice Scalia, in those portions of his McCreary dissent
joined by the Chief Justice and Justice Thomas, drew on historic
practices in rejecting the notion of strict neutrality between
religion and nonreligion. 28 5 Invocation of God, he argued, is not
an establishment and, in the view of the dissenters, the
Establishment Clause resolves the tension inherent in the
impossibility of a neutrality in favor of the promotion of
monotheistic religion.
[I]n the context of public acknowledgments of God there
are legitimate competing interests: On the one hand, the
interest of that minority in not feeling "excluded"; but on
the other, the interest of the overwhelming majority of
religious believers in being able to give God thanks and
supplication as a people, and with respect to our national
endeavors. Our national tradition has resolved that
conflict in favor of the majority. 286
In a recent historical survey, Father Thomas Curry argues
that eighteenth century establishment was understood to refer to
a church which the government funded and controlled and in
285. McCreary, 125 S. Ct. at 2756.
286. Id. at 2756 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted) (emphasis
supplied). See also Engel v. Vitale, 330 U.S. 425, 445 (1947) (Stewart, J.,
dissenting) ("I think that to deny the wish of these school children to join in
reciting this prayer is to deny them the opportunity of sharing in the spiritual
heritage of our Nation."). The McCreary dissent nevertheless suggests that
government may not endorse any particular form of monotheism. If,
however, government is to continue to involve itself in aspects of life with
which religion is concerned, and on which it offers different answers, even
this more limited form of neutrality may not be possible.
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which government uses its coercive power to encourage
participation.287 Professor Gedicks has made the same point, i.e.,
a classic eighteenth century establishment was a state church
supported by taxation and, to which, perhaps allegiance was
either required or rewarded with concrete privileges.288
It is hardly the mark of an unthinking originalism or of a
capitulation to the judgment of those who are long dead to suggest
that such an establishment - or something that looks an awful lot
like it - is at the core of the First Amendment's protection.
Although much of modern Establishment Clause jurisprudence
and theory has reacted to the changed role of the contemporary
state by expanding the reach of disestablishment as the
government's role has grown, there is no logical necessity to do so.
The expansion of the modern state reflected a change in notions
regarding not just the scope but the purpose of government.
Coming to see disestablishment as a guarantee of secularized
public space or a requirement of a public neutrality rather than as
a bulwark against coercion is also a conceptual change, but one
that is distinct and not necessarily compelled by the first. Put
another way, the imperative separation may have been necessary
and workable as applied to the activities of seventeenth century
government.28 9 It may be neither today.
While neither Father Curry nor Professor Gedicks argue for
the precise approach taken by Justices Scalia or Thomas, or the
approach advocated here, might there not be a sense in which
establishment requires government support of religion that
surpasses a certain threshold, i.e., that risks the creation of an
institutional establishment or of the harm thought to be
associated with it?
Most fundamentally, the Establishment Clause requires an
institutional separation of church and state. The government may
287. THOMAS J. CURRY, FAREWELL TO CHRISTENDOM: THE FUTURE OF
CHURCH AND STATE IN AMERICA (2001).
288. Frederick Mark Gedicks, A Two-Track Theory of the Establishment
Clause, 43 B.C. L. REV. 1071, 1093-94 (2002).
289. See, e.g., Kevin Pybas, Does The Establishment Clause Require
Religion To Be Confined To The Public Sphere?, 40 VAL. U. L. REV. 71, 85
(2005) (asking whether "given that Jefferson's and Madison's views on
religious liberty were part of a set of beliefs that also included belief in
limited government, does it make sense to invoke the former when we have
rejected the latter").
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not proclaim that Christianity is the official religion of the United
States, directly fund churches, discipline or regulate clergy,
prescribe ecclesiastical rules, etc. It ought not to be in the
business of running churches.
This does not mean as Zelman and Rosenberger demonstrate,
that government funds can never be used to subsidize religious
activities through, for example, the mechanisms of individual
choice or the state's maintenance of open fora.
Although some argue that the sine qua non of
disestablishment is the prohibition of the direct or indirect
allocation of tax dollars for religious purposes,2 90 this, too, cannot
survive the expansion of government. It is difficult to see how an
agnostic is any more aggrieved by funding a nondenominational
prayer, than an evangelical might be by the knowledge that her
tax dollars are used to fund thoroughly secular approaches to
areas of life in which she believes that faith is indispensable. If
liberty of conscience is threatened by requiring one to fund
proselytizing for a God that does not exist, then why is it not
similarly threatened by diverting tax funds to promote, or at least
model, the notion that a comprehensive life view, or attention to
life's most difficult questions, can and are routinely answered
without a God who one believes to be sovereign?
2. No establishment means no coercion
Concurring in Van Orden, Justice Thomas argued that
establishment requires "actual legal coercion."291 While coercion
may not always be necessary, 292 it should certainly be sufficient.
Beyond the creation of a straight forward establishment, the
government must avoid coercion. The core concern of the
Establishment Clause is, and ought to be, religious liberty,293 i.e.,
290. FELDMAN, supra note 189, at 247.
291. Van Orden v. Perry, 125 S. Ct. 2854, 2865 (2005) (Thomas, J.,
concurring). See Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 640 (1992) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) ("The coercion that was a hallmark of historical establishments of
religion was coercion of religious orthodoxy and of financial support by force
of law and threat of penalty.").
292. I have already argued that there must be an institutional separation
of church and state. It is also possible for government actions that present
direct and substantial threats to religious pluralism to constitute
Establishment.
293. Consideration of the historical and philosophical underpinning of this
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the ability of each person to form beliefs and to act on religious
matters without interference from his government. If being
exposed to a nondenominational prayer or to a valedictorian's
attempt at religious proselytization, however unpleasant, does not
significantly interfere with that liberty, the Establishment Clause
is not implicated.
Some have argued that these rights of conscience are
adequately protected by the Free Exercise clause and, therefore,
the Establishment Clause cannot be concerned with coercion. 294
Disestablishment, the argument goes, must apply to something
more than that which interferes with free exercise. But, it seems
just as plausible to conclude, with Professor Feldman, that the two
clauses are concerned with preventing the state from stopping a
person from what she wishes to do (Free Exercise) and preventing
it from compelling her to do what she does not wish to do
(Establishment).295
While one could regard both as incorporated in the concept of
free exercise (making one profess or endorse that which he does
not wish to arguably infringes his freedom of conscience), 296 there
is no logical reason that one must do so and little or no historical
evidence that the framers so intended.
One might just as easily argue that Free Exercise subsumes
not only compelled professions of faith, but also compelled support
of a religious perspective or, for that matter, mere exposure to an
officially endorsed religious viewpoint. 297 Although the historical
view is beyond the scope of this article. See, e.g., Noah Feldman, The
Intellectual Origins of the Establishment Clause, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 346, 350
(2002) (arguing that both rationalists and evangelicals argued that the
purpose of nonestablishment was to protect liberty of conscience from the
coercive power of government); Mary Ann Glendon, The Origins and
Historical Understanding of Free Exercise of Religion, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1409,
1497-91 (1990) (religion is privileged because it is an obligation owed to a
higher sovereign).
294. Justice Kennedy, for example, has argued that government actions
that constitute establishment need not violate free exercise because "the
Establishment Clause has a specific prohibition in forms of state intervention
with no precise counterparts in the speech provision." Lee, 505 U.S. at 591.
295. FELDMAN, supra note 189, at 49-50.
296. Douglas Laycock, "Nonpreferential" Aid to Religion: A False Claim
About Original Intent, 27 WM. & MARY L. REV. 875, 922 (1986) ("If coercion is
also an element of the Establishment Clause, establishment adds nothing to
free exercise.").
297. For example, one might just as readily argue that a believer is under
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record may not be clear on whether there was a consensus
regarding whether the notion of "establishment" did or did not
include nonpreferential aid to religion or even endorsement of
nondenominational religion with freedom for dissenters, it is clear
that most of the antipathy toward establishment centered on
notions of compulsion.298
On the other hand, coercion must be properly understood and
cannot be tantamount to being made to feel comfortable. We
cannot make "the social world . . . acceptable to every last
individual. '299 Justices Kennedy 300 (and Jackson before him) 301
observed that the Constitution was not intended to and cannot
protect minorities from feeling like, well, minorities. While these
observations may be, on some level, "insensitive," there is no less
insensitivity involved in the exclusion of religious people and their
perspectives. It is far better to abandon the charade that
everyone's discomfort can be avoided. There is a difference
between being free to dissent and claiming the right to pretend
that one is not a dissenter.302
Professor James Beattie has attempted to root this distinction
a religious duty to avoid contamination by exposure to the unholy. See, e.g.,
Stolzenberg, supra note 204, at 611 (plaintiffs in Mozert claimed that mere
exposure is a form of value inculcation); 2 Corinthians 6:14 ("Be ye not
unequally yoked together with unbelievers"), or that being made to "feel like
an outsider" as the price of one's religious practices is an impairment of free
exercise.
298. THOMAS C. BERG, THE STATE AND RELIGION IN A NUTSHELL 53 (1998).
299. JEREMY WALDRON, LIBERAL RIGHTS: COLLECTED PAPERS, 1981-1991, at
36-37 (1993).
300. County of Allegheny v. ACLU, Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, 492 U.S.
573, 655 (1989) ("[I]t borders on sophistry to suggest that the 'reasonable'
atheist would feel less than a 'full member of the political community' every
time his fellow Americans recited, as part of their expression of their
patriotism and love for country, a phrase he believed to be false.") (Kennedy,
J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
301. Illinois ex rel McCollum v. Bd. of Educ. of Sch. Dist. No. 71,
Champagne County, Ill., 333 U.S. 203, 232-33 (1948) (Jackson, J., concurring)
(doubting the constitution can be construed "to protect one from the
embarrassment that always attends nonconformity, whether in religion,
politics, behavior or class").
302. Lisa Shaw Roy, The Establishment Clause and the Concept of
Inclusion, 82 OR. L. REV. 1, 36 (2004) ("By advocating what has traditionally
been termed a 'religion of secularism,' defenders of the religious minority aim
to transform the public square into one in which dissent is no longer
required.").
64 ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITY LAWREVIEW [Vol. 12:1
in John Stuart Mill's notion that government regulation can only
be justified as the prevention of harm and the ancillary idea that
the existence of moral distress is not harm. He writes:
To justify political regulation there must be a dimension
of preventing harm to others, and the feelings of others do
not count as harm. If, on the other hand, endorsement
means something more, namely that government puts in
place some form of sanctions or penalties backed by force
of law - viz, those citizens that the regulation penalizes
are "outsiders" and those who are not are "insiders" -
then only the most imprecise use of language allows us to
claim that government is sending a "message" of
endorsement. In this scenario, government is sending a
sheriff, not a message. 303
Even if we accept the curious modern notion that one should
be offended by exposure to that with which one does not agree,
offense is not tantamount to being coerced. If merely hearing
something we do not like or being reminded that most others
believe differently than we do amounts to coercion, then we are
back where we started. Except that this time, if we are honest
about the non-neutrality of a secularist baseline, we have adopted
a rule of near-paralysis, precluding government from speaking on
any topic about which religion may have something to say. We
will have fallen into the very trap that has caused so many to urge
that we overlook endorsement of the secular.
3. Nonestablishment Means Respect For Religious Pluralism
This is not to suggest that the only way in which the
government can run afoul of the Establishment Clause is to put its
citizens to the fire.
Professor Ravitch has advocated a "substantial facilitation"
test. He would ask whether a state action substantially facilitates
religion (and would set the bar on that question relatively low).3 04
Perhaps what we need is a test focused upon whether a state
action creates a "substantial risk" of suppressing religious
303. James R. Beattie, Jr., Taking Liberalism and Religious Liberty
Seriously: Shifting Our Notion of Toleration From Locke to Mill, 43 CATH.
LAw. 367, 402 (2004).
304. See Ravitch, supra note 33, at 546-47.
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differences.
Evaluating the nature of the threat may be aided by resort to
the concept of a "free market" in religious ideas. Government is,
of course, free to engage in political speech without impinging
upon the First Amendments protection of free speech.
But the Establishment Clause does place limits on its ability
to engage in religious speech or in speech that might affect its
citizen's religious choices. Although it is not possible, at least
given our modern notions regarding the role of government, for it
to completely refrain from such speech, it may not act in a way
that poses a substantial risk of distorting the religious choices of
its citizens. This is a form of "substantive neutrality," but a more
modest form. It seeks only rough justice. Government action
becomes "practically coercive" when it creates a substantial threat
to religious pluralism or of suppressing religious differences. 305
Minorities will feel like minorities. This is inevitable. What
is not inevitable is the government's use of its power and prestige
to make continued adherence to a minority faith - or no faith at
all - untenable. Government may acknowledge the religious
sentiments of the majority, but it may not attack, or act to
extirpate or to penalize, those of the minority.
The proponents of endorsement neutrality also claim to be
acting in the interests of religious pluralism. The difference, it
seems to me, lies in defining what constitutes such a threat. The
question cannot be whether nonadherents are made to "feel" like
outsiders. This, as we have seen, is a standard that is incapable of
even-handed application.
It bears repeating that an attack upon the religious
sensibilities of its citizens may lie in government promotion of
secularism as well as in the promotion of a particular religion or
religion in general. Mary Ann Glendon has argued that the Bill of
Rights was designed to protect and empower intermediate
associations and "the diverse local arrangements that the citizens
of the several states had made with respect to religion. ' 306 "'The
people,"' she concluded, are "protected, not only in their solitary
305. Michael W. McConnell, The Origins and Historical Understanding of
Free Exercise of Religion, 102 HARv. L. REV. 1409, 1516 (1990).
306. Mary Ann Glendon & Raul F. Yanes, Structural Free Exercise, 90
MICH. L. REV. 477, 543 (1991).
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individual religious beliefs and practices, but in the associations
and institutions where those beliefs and practices were generated,
regenerated, nurtured, promoted, and transmitted. 307
If one subscribes to a post liberal conception of religion and
believes that faith is affected by the surrounding culture and
requires communal expression, then an increasingly large - and
largely secular - public sphere compelled by force of law is
problematic. When schools, social services and public gathering
spaces are increasingly provided by the state and, for that reason,
are increasingly secular, it becomes far more likely that faith itself
will be crowded out or secularized.
It is for this reason that neither rigorous neutrality nor
nonendorsement is possible. Government will inevitably promote
views that are not religiously neutral or that it will be reasonably
perceived as placing its imprimatur on some concept related to
God or His absence. It engages in establishment, however, only
when it substantially burdens dissent, not when it merely makes
it uncomfortable.
There are government actions that, while stopping short of
compelled worship or confessions of belief, are so overbearing and
such substantial interferences with the religious life of its citizens
that they are tantamount to coercion. One can imagine efforts by
the government in support of one religion that may so overwhelm
individuals' exercise of their religion as to be practically coercive.
For example, a concerted government campaign critical of a
particular faith group - or of atheists - might violate the
Establishment Clause 308 as might a campaign that threw the
weight of the state's authority and treasury behind a particular
religion. 30 9
How would this change Establishment Clause jurisprudence?
Much of the litigation regarding private religious expression in
312. Id.
308. Thus the Establishment Clause would prohibit something like the
Nazi policy of Gleichshaltung, consisting of state vilification of Jews and
labeling as undesirable (Auschaltung) Jews and other undesirables. This
policy, while combined with coercive policies, was distinct from and
facilitated them. See generally CLAUDIA KOONTZ, THE NAzI CONSCIENCE (2003)
State vilification of non-believers would be equally problematic. This does
not mean, however, that government may never criticize a religious position.
309. As noted earlier, however, Justice Scalia would permit preferential
endorsement of monotheism.
2006] A MORE MODEST ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE 67
government forums is about whether the communication can be
attributed to the state. If a school permits its valedictorian to
include a religious message within her commencement speech,
does that mean that the school has endorsed that message? Is the
state "advancing" religion when it posts a student's artwork or
essay which he has chosen to center upon a religious theme?
These questions, while not entirely inapposite under the approach
argued here, are of less importance because, only expressions, that
even if they might be attributed to the government, threaten
religious pluralism or risk the creation of an establishment are
constitutionally problematic.
It would no longer be necessary to plumb the intricacies of the
Lemon test. While it would certainly matter whether a
government action had a religious, secular (or secularist) purpose,
whether it advanced or inhibited religion and the extent to which
it entangled the church and state, these would become
constitutionally problematic only when they created the risk of an
institutional establishment, amounted to coercion, or constituted a
substantial threat to religious pluralism.
This approach may not entirely satisfy the religious. It will
not ensure that irreligious messages are not advanced by the
government, at least not until they rise to the threat of an
establishment of secularism or a threat to religious liberty. An
illustrative example is the Ninth Circuit's decision in American
Family Association v. San Francisco.3 10 In that case, the San
Francisco Board of Supervisors passed a resolution condemning
an organization that had run ads expressing the view that
homosexuality is a sin from which one can - and ought to - turn
away.311 In response, the Board passed resolutions calling upon
local television stations to boycott the ads (which they did) and
associating the ads with the murder of a gay man in Alabama.
Although the Ninth Circuit rejected the Association's free
exercise and Establishment Clause challenges, the case was a
tough one under notions of nonendorsement. Certainly, in that
case, the government could be said to have taken a position on a
religious point of view in a way that made its adherents feel like
political outsiders and the mere fact that it did not focus on the
310. 277 F.3d 1114 (9th Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 123 S. Ct. 129 (2002).
311. Id. at 1119.
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religious etiology of the view it condemned did not make that any
less the case.
Although one could argue that the resolutions condemning
the faith-based message of an evangelical Christian organization
is a threat to religious pluralism, it does not seem sufficiently
systematic nor comprehensive to pose any real risk of distorting
the free market for religious ideas.312
But the rigorously secular will not be satisfied either. Under
this approach, it seems clear that Lee and Santa Fe were wrongly
decided. However uncomfortable a nonadherent may have felt at
exposure to brief prayer, it beggars reality to suggest that this
threatens religious pluralism.
Nor do displays of the Ten Commandments, recitation of the
words "under God" in the Pledge of Allegiance, 313 or, for that
matter, moments of silence (or perhaps even voluntary prayer)
violate the Establishment Clause.
VIII. CONCLUSION
One might characterize this approach as one which permits
greater leeway for government religious speech as long as it does
not go "too far." I acknowledge that and recognize that defining
that point at which government has gone "too far" is difficult and
inevitably imprecise. But the difficulty of line drawing hardly
justifies the zero tolerance policy that is more characteristic of our
current approach.
Because a policy of nonendorsement cannot be evenly applied,
our current jurisprudence does not accomplish what it sets out to
do. It most decidedly does not prevent the state from making
some "feel like outsiders" on the basis of their religion. It does not
communicate to all that the government is "theirs." These are
goals that cannot be achieved. It is time to give up.
The approach advocated here would not necessarily result in
312. The outcome may be different if, for example, the Board of
Supervisors had threatened to pull city business from, or boycott the news
departments of, any station running the ads.
313. Newdow v. Cong. of the United States, 292 F.3d 597, 614 (9th Cir.
2002) (Fernandez, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) ('In God We
Trust,' and 'under God' have no tendency to establish a religion in [the
United States] or to suppress anyone's exercise, or non-exercise, of religion,
except in the fevered eye of persons who most fervently would like to drive all
tincture of religion out of the public life of our policy.").
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more religion in public places. In parts of our nation
characterized by substantial religious diversity or by a secular
consensus, public classrooms and spaces may look much as they
do today. But if so, they will not be lodged in a hypocritical and
implausible claim of neutrality.
But elsewhere there will be more room for organic,
noncoercive and limited expression of faith in places and on topics
where it is natural to do so. While Establishment Clause
litigation will not be eliminated, it will lose much of its trivial
character. It will no longer be concerned with the extirpation of
slight and innocuous religious references - a project that does
little to advance religious freedom and much to suggest to the
public at large that our constitutional exegesis is no longer
concerned with serious questions.
If that is all we can do, it may be enough.
